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LISA SMITH-BUTLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jared and Delilah—two high school students at James Island County 
High—dated for months, claiming each other as “soul mates.”  A new stu-
dent, Perry, then arrived at school, and Delilah broke up with Jared to pursue 
a relationship with Perry.  After the breakup, Jared hated Delilah and thought 
the worst of her.  While working from home on his laptop, Jared posted 
comments to his Facebook page, stating that Delilah was a lying, cheating 
whore who was HIV positive.  Other derogatory comments followed.  
Classmates shared Jared’s post.  Many of the school’s students and some of 
the school’s personnel read the comments while at home.  A national news 
reporter related to one of the school’s teachers saw the post, picked up the 
story, and began publishing a series of articles on teen cyberbullying.  The 
school was in an uproar.  Students sided with either Jared or Delilah.  No one 
stayed neutral.  Delilah and her parents went to school to complain to the 
principal.  They alleged that Jared’s behavior constituted harassment of Deli-
lah because of her sex.  Delilah and her parents insisted that the school pun-
ish Jared. 
While the above is a hypothetical, it is a scenario that schools and 
school administrations are facing across the country.  This is speech that 
takes place off-campus and after school hours yet it impacts the school.  Can 
the principal address the issue and punish Jared for this speech?  Should the 
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principal tell Delilah and her parents that their options are limited to suing 
Jared for libel?  Can the school lose its funding from the Department of Edu-
cation for failing to enforce anti-harassment policies?  Is there liability to 
which the school will be subjected at the state level for failing to adequately 
address cyberbullying?  These are conflicts that American school personnel 
now face on a frequent basis.  How do school officials handle and resolve the 
conflicting rights of students, their parents, and teachers regarding free 
speech with the right to be let alone and be free from bullying and cyberbul-
lying? 
This article will examine whether public school officials can regulate 
and punish off-campus student cyberspeech when this speech makes its way 
onto the school’s campus.  It will review recent federal district and circuit 
court decisions from the past decade that interpret and apply the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ student speech analysis.1  It will examine the in-
teraction of this analysis with the First Amendment,2 the Department of Edu-
cation’s Office for Civil Rights’ laws and the Department of Education’s 
interpretation of harassment that applies to schools,3 and state legislatures’ 
attempts to limit and cope with cyberbullying in the public school setting.4
While bullying has been an issue with which schools and students have 
coped for decades, if not centuries, cyberbullying is a recent phenomenon.5
How is cyberbullying defined,6 and how does it differ from bullying? 
 * Lisa Smith-Butler is the Associate Dean for Information Resources and Associate 
Professor of Law at the Charleston School of Law where she teaches Children and the Law.  
She would like to thank her research assistants, Brianna Hewitt, Annie Andrews, and Cassan-
dra Hutchens for their research assistance with this article and her assistant, Carrie Cranford.  
She would also like to thank colleagues, present and former, as well as the librarians at the 
Charleston School of Law, for reviewing the article and offering suggestions. 
 1. See discussion infra Part II.B–C. 
 2. See discussion infra Part II. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III.  The Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of 
Education.  OCR: Know Your Rights, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ocr/know.html (last modified April 5, 2012).  Because of this, the Department of Education 
interacts frequently with school administrators for elementary and secondary schools, voca-
tional schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools, state education agencies, librar-
ies, and museums.  See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2006); see also OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra.
The Office of Civil Rights enforces the statutes prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of 
race, color, and national origin, sex, [and] disability.”  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra; see
also 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 2000d. 
 4. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Robin M. Kowalski, Teasing and Bullying, in THE DARK SIDE OF INTERPERSONAL 
COMMUNICATION 169, 169 (Brian H. Spitzberg & William R. Cupach eds., 2d ed. 2007); R.
CHACE RAMEY, STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH AND EXPRESSION RIGHTS: ARMBANDS TO 
BONG HITS 139 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2011). 
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Several decisions from lower courts provide examples that demonstrate 
courts’ definitions of cyberbullying.  In the last few years, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits heard 
arguments and then published decisions involving off-campus student cyber-
speech.7  A review of each decision provides examples of what the courts 
and legislatures consider to constitute cyberbullying or threats.  While the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits have hand-
ed down two decisions each on the topic,8 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits each issued only one opinion.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered 
two cases involving off-campus student cyberspeech.10  Both decisions in-
volved speech that was critical of school officials.11  In one case, a middle 
school student created an instant message icon on his home computer that 
showed a “pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, above which were dots 
representing spattered blood.  Beneath the drawing appeared the words ‘Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen.’”12  Four years later, the court confronted a similar case in 
which a student disagreed with a school’s decision to refuse to allow students 
to use a certain facility on a particular date for Jamfest.13  The school gave 
the students the option to hold Jamfest in another location or reschedule the 
 6. The Oxford English Dictionary defines cyberbully as “cyberbully, n[oun], (a) an 
experienced user of computers who intimidates new users (nonce-use); (b) a person who en-
gages in cyberbullying.”  Cyber-bully, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/250879?redirectedFrom=cyber-bully#eid212385813 (subscription required) (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2012) (copy on file with Nova Law Review).  “The anonymity afforded by cyberbul-
lying suggests that cyberbullies are, in all likelihood, not the same individuals as the school-
yard bullies.”  Kowalski, supra note 5, at 190. 
 7. See Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II), 642 F.3d 334, 340, 358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); Lay-
shock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock II), 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir.), 
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II), 593 
F.3d 286, 295, 308 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski I), 652 F.3d 565, 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1095 (2012); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 
767 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 8. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344; J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; Layshock 
II, 593 F.3d at 263; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 9. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764, 767; Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574. 
 10. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 11. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344–48; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 12. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36 (footnote omitted). 
 13. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 339. 
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event.14  Students objected.15  One student, Avery Doninger, created a blog at 
home on her parents’ computer, urging students, their parents, and concerned 
citizens to call the “douchebags” at the school office to complain.16  In both 
of these decisions, the school’s punishment of the students’ speech was al-
lowed to stand.17
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also dealt with 
cases that involved the use of the internet to criticize school officials.18  The 
court confronted two cases in its 2009 term.19  One case arose from the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania,20 while the other case came out of the Western 
District of Pennsylvania.21  Both cases involved similar facts yet two differ-
ent panels appeared to reach opposite results.22  In one case, a high school 
senior created a parody profile of his high school principal while at home on 
his MySpace account, referring to the principal as a “big steroid freak,” “big 
whore,” and “big fag” along with other “big” insults.23  He then shared the 
profile parody with other friends from school.24  While the court was sympa-
thetic to the principal’s distress, it concluded that the school’s punishment 
had violated the student’s free speech rights.25  On the same day, a different 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also handed 
down a decision, arising from the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, involving another high school parody of a school 
 14. Id.
 15. Id.
 16. Id. at 334, 340–41. 
 17. Id. at 351, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40. 
 18. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 19. Id. at 286; Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 251 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g 
granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 20. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder I), No. 3:07cv585, 
2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F. 
3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 21. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. (Layshock I), 496 F. Supp. 2d 
587, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007) aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 22. Paul Easton, Comment, Splitting the Difference:  Layshock and J.S. Chart a Separate 
Path on Student Speech Rights, 53 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 17, 17 (2012), 
http://bclawreview.org/files/2012/02/02_easton.pdf.  Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 
at 307–08, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 264. 
 23. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53. 
 24. Id. at 253. 
 25. Id. at 264. 
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principal.26  In this particular case, a student created an online profile of her 
high school principal, describing his interests as:  “detention.  being a tight 
ass.  riding the fraintrain.  spending time with my child (who looks like a 
gorilla).  baseball.my golden pen. [sic]  fucking in my office.  hitting on stu-
dents and their parents.”27  This decision upheld the school’s punishment of 
the student.28
While both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Third Circuits heard cases involving student criticism of school officials, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard and published an 
opinion in a case involving student-on-student internet speech.29  The deci-
sion arose in West Virginia and involved a female student who created a web 
page that was allegedly about another classmate.30  The website labeled the 
female student a “whore” and stated that “Shay [h]as [h]erpes.”31  The stu-
dent, Kara Kowalski, was suspended and then she sued, alleging a violation 
of her free speech.32  The court concluded that the school did not violate her 
free speech rights when it punished her.33
Lastly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
viewed, de novo, a decision for summary judgment from the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Public School District No. 60.34 D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. differs from 
the Snyder v. Phelps,35 Kowalski v. Berkeley County School (Kowalski I),36
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock III),37
Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger II),38 and Wisniewski v. Board of Education39
 26. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 290–91; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 
3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en 
banc, 650 F. 3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 27. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 291 (footnote omitted). 
 28. Id. at 307–08. 
 29. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); see also Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 334, 339–40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 
(2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 286, 291; Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 252; 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 34–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 30. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567. 
 31. Id. at 568. 
 32. Id. at 567, 569–70. 
 33. Id. at 577. 
 34. 647 F.3d 754–55, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 35. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 36. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 37. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. 
Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 38. 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 39. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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decisions, because D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved threats against other stu-
dents, made by D.J.M. to another classmate, via his home computer.40  A 
concerned classmate shared the threatening emails, which included threats to 
“get[] a gun and shoot[] other students,” with the principal who then con-
tacted the police.41  After D.J.M. was released from juvenile detention, he 
was suspended for ten days by the school; shortly thereafter, he was sus-
pended for the remainder of the semester.42  D.J.M. and his parents then sued 
the school, arguing that his First Amendment speech rights had been violated 
as he contended that his threats did not constitute “true threats.”43  The 
Eighth Circuit upheld the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Missouri’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Hannibal School 
District.44
All of the above cases describe factual backgrounds from circuit court 
decisions that involved off-campus student cyberspeech, which ultimately 
found its way on campus.45  Students used their home computers, working on 
their own time rather than school time, to create web pages that were aimed 
at officials or classmates to protest or complain about school-related person-
nel, classmates, or events.46  Although these web pages were created off-
campus without school equipment, the schools punished—typically either 
with suspension or expulsion—the speech and the students.47  These punish-
ments were then appealed by parents, arguing such school conduct violated 
the students’ First Amendment rights.48
This type of speech has existed for years in school settings.49  Principals 
disciplined.50  Students grumbled.51  Students insulted each other.  Because 
the speech was not easily or readily publicized, it went unnoticed and was 
 40. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756–
57 (8th Cir. 2011), with Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213, Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567, Layshock III,
650 F.3d at 207–08, Doninger II, 642 F.2d at 339, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
 41. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756.
 42. Id. at 757. 
 43. Id. at 759–60; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 44. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 767. 
 45. See Martha McCarthy, Student Electronic Expression:  Unanswered Questions Per-
sist, 277 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 4–9 (2012). 
 46. Id.
 47. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–37 (2d Cir. 2007); McCarthy, supra
note 45, at 4–8. 
 48. See McCarthy, supra note 45, at 5–8. 
 49. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 1. 
 50. Id.
 51. See id.
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ignored.52  The internet, or cyberspace, changed this.53  Principals and school 
personnel were mocked and insulted online.54  Student rivalries and bullying 
moved off the playground and online.55  What once took weeks, months, and 
sometimes years to travel through a community now buzzed through it in 
hours, if not minutes.56  What was once only local news, now often goes vi-
ral, becoming national news in just hours.57
If such behavior was ignored in the past, why are school authorities now 
eager to regulate this type of student speech?  Are schools seeking to expand 
their authority and power over students?  Or, are schools trying to reign in 
students and sort out threats, cope with the effects of student-on-student cy-
berbullying, and teach students civil discourse in addition to teaching the 
standard curriculum while also coping with the impact of No Child Left Be-
hind?  What happened? 
April 20, 199958 altered the public school landscape as thoroughly as 
September 11, 200159 changed air travel.  On April 20th, Eric Harris and 
Dylan Klebold opened fire at 11:19 a.m. at Columbine High School in Col-
umbine, Colorado.60  Their massacre lasted forty-nine minutes. 61  They killed 
thirteen people and wounded twenty-four.62  Their rampage ended at 12:08 
p.m. when they committed suicide,63 bringing the total number killed in the 
 52. See VICTORIA STUART-CASSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANALYSIS OF STATE 
BULLYING LAWS AND POLICIES 1 (2011), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/bullying/state-bullying-laws/state-bullying-laws.pdf; Kow-
alski, supra note 5, at 185. 
 53. See RAMEY, supra note 5, at 139. 
 54. Id. at 139, 141. 
 55. See id. at 141–42; Jocelyn Ho, Note, Bullied to Death:  Cyberbullying and Student 
Online Speech Rights, 64 FLA. L. REV. 789, 791 (2012). 
 56. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 11 (2007). 
 57. For an example of local news rapidly becoming national news, consider the story of 
Karen Klein.  Online Campaign Winds Down for Bullied NY Woman, AP: THE BIG STORY,
July 20, 2012, 3:13 PM, http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/online-campaign-winds-down-
bullied-ny-woman.  In June of 2012, Karen Klein, a bus monitor employed by the public 
school system in Greece, New York, was recorded being bullied by students on the bus.  Id.
The video was posted online and “show[ed] Klein enduring profanity, insults, and threats from 
middle school students on a school bus.”  Id.
 58. See DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 4–5 (2009) [hereinafter CULLEN, COLUMBINE]. 
 59. See Garrick Blalock et al., The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the 
Demand for Air Travel, 50 J.L. & ECON. 731, 731,733 (2007). 
 60. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 4–7, 35, 46. 
 61. Id. at 83. 
 62. Id. at 4–5. 
 63. Id. at 83. 
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Columbine Massacre to fifteen.64  An investigation revealed hate-filled web 
sites created by the student killers, journal entries containing threats and 
plans, and other bizarre behaviors.65  While some of these items came to the 
attention of law enforcement before the massacre, none of it was taken seri-
ously until after the massacre.66  Recrimination, blame, lawsuits, new school 
policies, and zero tolerance resulted.67  When asked for an explanation for 
Harris’s and Klebold’s behavior, some said they had been bullied.68
Besides school violence and school shootings,69 cyberbullying and cy-
berharassment have become well-publicized problems that public schools are 
encountering.70  In Massachusetts, in January of 2010, high school freshman, 
Phoebe Prince, committed suicide after enduring on-campus bullying and 
cyberbullying that her parents allege the school’s administration knew about, 
but did nothing to stop.71  What cyberbullying was used?  Besides in-school 
taunts and insults, students also posted on Prince’s Facebook page, calling 
her a “slut” and “whore.”72  Three of the six students charged with the crimi-
nal harassment, i.e., bullying, of Prince were placed on probation in May of 
201173 while the town of South Hadley settled its suit by Prince’s parents for 
 64. See id. at 5, 83–84. 
 65. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 35, 183–84. 
 66. Id. at 84–85, 165–66, 220. 
 67. David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech:  The Effect of Diminish-
ing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT 
C.L. 199, 209–10 (2000). 
 68. CULLEN, COLUMBINE, supra note 58, at 157–58, 339. 
 69. Since April 20, 1999, there have been more than thirty public school shootings in the 
United States.  Time Line of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013). 
 70. Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying, 
and Teen Suicides After Sexting:  Are New Legal Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 NEW 
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227, 240–41 (2011). 
 71. Kevin Cullen, A Mother’s Farewell, Forbidding Vengeance:  Phoebe Prince, Her 
Daughter, Lost, She Shares a Shattered Heart, BOS. GLOBE, May 15, 2011, at A1. 
 72. U.S. Teenagers Charged over Suicide of Irish ‘New Girl’ Targeted in ‘Relentless’ 
School Bullying Campaign, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 31, 2010, 12:03 AM), http://www. daily-
mail.co.uk/news/article-1262487/phoebe-prince-9-us-teenagers-charged-suicide-death-irish-
new-girl.html. 
 73. Erik Eckholm, 3 Ex-Students Get Probation in Bullying Linked to a Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/us/06bully.html. 
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$225,000.74  Since Prince’s death, there have been several high profile cyber-
bullying cases involving student suicides.75
With school violence and cyberbullying increasing,76 schools, school 
boards, state legislatures, and the Department of Education are attempting to 
create solutions to deal with the rise of bullying, cyberbullying, and cyber-
harassment.  According to the National School Board Association, forty-
eight states as of April 201277 have enacted some form of legislation78 that 
concerns bullying, cyberbullying, or harassment by students in the public 
school setting.79  The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
drafted and published a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on October 26, 2010, 
 74. O’Ryan Johnson, Town Paid $225G to Avoid Phoebe Prince Suit:  ACLU Forces 
South Hadley to Disclose Sum, BOS. HERALD, Dec. 28, 2011, http://bostonherald.com 
/news/regional/view/2011_1228town_paid_225g_to_avoid_prince_suit_aclu_forces_south_ha
dley_to_disclose_sum. 
 75. Ho, supra note 55, at 789.  For further commentary, as well as discussion of specific 
cases of “bullycide,” see Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented:  Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 
TEMP. L. REV. 385, 392–94 (2012). 
 76. Ho, supra note 55, at 789. 
 77. See NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, STATE ANTI-BULLYING STATUTES APRIL 2012 (2012), 
http://www.nsba.org/SchoolLaw/Issues/Safety/Table.pdf. 
 78. ALA. CODE §§ 16-28B-1 to -9 (2012); ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.200–.250 (2012); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2012) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2012); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 32261, 48900, 48900.4 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-93-101 to -106 
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2012) (Lex-
isNexis); FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (2012); HAW. CODE R. 
§§ 8-19-2, -6 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/10-22.6, 5/27-23.7 (2012); IND. CODE §§ 20-26-5-33, 20-33-8-0.2, 20-33-8-13.5 (2012); 
IOWA CODE § 280.28 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
525.070, .080 (LexisNexis 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416.1 (2012); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 20-A, § 1001 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-424, 7-424.1 (LexisNexis 2012); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1310b (2012); MINN. STAT.
§§ 120B.232, 121A.0695 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-20, -67 (2012); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 160.775 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 79-267, 79-2,137 (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
193-F:1 to :6 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-14, -15 to -15.3, -16, -17 (West 2012); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW §§ 801-a, 2801 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15–.18 (2012); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-17-22 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (LexisNexis 
2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, §§ 24-100.2–.5 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.351, .353, .356, 
.359, .362, .364 (2012); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. §13-1303.1-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
21-34 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-110 to -150 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014 
to -1019 (2012); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.0342, 28.002, 37.001, 37.083 (West 2012); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, -201, -202, -301, -302, -401, -402 (LexisNexis 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-208.01, -279.6 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 570, 570c (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 28A.300.285, 28A.600.480 (2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 18-2C-2 to -3 
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.46 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4-311 to -315 (2012). 
 79. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. 
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concerning the same issue.80  The problem has become so pervasive and per-
sistent that the American Jewish Committee and the Religious Freedom Edu-
cation Project jointly published Harassment, Bullying, and Free Expression:  
Guidelines for Free and Safe Public Schools.81
Students, disciplined under these school policies, are suing, arguing that 
their schools have violated their First Amendment rights by imposing disci-
pline for what amounts to off-campus cyberspeech, which is protected by the 
First Amendment.82  Constitutional law scholar and dean, Erwin Chemerin-
sky,83 argues in an essay that this is all part of the “deconstitutionalization of 
education” by the Supreme Court.84  Chemerinsky concludes that the “Su-
preme Court’s overall approach has been to withdraw the courts from in-
volvement in American schools.”85  He examines the Court’s decisions in the 
areas of desegregation, school funding, and freedom of speech.86  Chemerin-
sky argues that “[u]nder current First Amendment law, the most basic princi-
ple is that the government generally cannot restrict speech based on content 
unless strict scrutiny is met.”87  Applying these principles to speech in the 
public university setting, Chemerinsky says “[a] public university simply 
cannot prohibit the expression of hate, including anti-Semitism, without run-
ning afoul of this principle.  Punishing speech because of its hateful message 
is inherently a content-based restriction on speech and would violate the First 
Amendment.”88
How are public schools handling student cyberspeech that can also be 
categorized as cyberbullying or cyberharassment?  Courts are relying on the 
 80. See Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to Colleague 1–2 
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201010.html [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter].
 81. AM. JEWISH COMM. & RELIGIOUS FREEDOM EDUC. PROJECT, HARASSMENT, BULLYING,
AND FREE EXPRESSION: GUIDELINES FOR FREE AND SAFE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 5 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/equity/harassment-bullying-and-free-
expression-guidelines-for-free-and-safe-public-schools.pdf. 
 82. Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the Cafeteria, and the Playing Field:  
Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made in a Student’s Bedroom?, 48 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 195–96 (2011). 
 83. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First 
Amendment Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 765 n.* (2009) [hereinafter Chemerin-
sky, Unpleasant Speech] (introducing Chemerinsky as “Dean and Distinguished Professor of 
Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law”). 
 84. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
111, 112 (2004). 
 85. Id.
 86. Id. at 113, 119, 124. 
 87. Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech, supra note 83, at 770. 
 88. Id.
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1969 Supreme Court decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District89 to regulate student cyberspeech in the public school 
setting.90  Despite utilizing the Tinker test, both federal district and circuit 
courts have reached a variety of different conclusions.91  Are the courts mis-
applying or misunderstanding Tinker?  Are the facts of each case determina-
tive of the outcome?  Are these decisions reconcilable or is there a circuit 
split? 
This article will examine the existing speech cases from federal district 
and circuit courts in light of the Morse quartet, a series of Supreme Court 
decisions on student speech rights.92  Part II will review the holdings of these 
decisions and explore their interaction with the First Amendment.93  Part III 
will review the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition 
of harassment while Part IV will examine state cyberbullying legislation.94
Part V will analyze and review the interplay of the United States Constitu-
tion, Supreme Court decisions, state legislation, the Department of Educa-
tion’s laws and interpretations thereof, and school policies with these cases, 
attempting to ascertain the appropriate analysis for student cyberspeech cas-
 89. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 90. E.g., Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 91. A selected list of federal district court cases involving regulation of off-campus stu-
dent speech includes:  T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 
767, 771, 784 (N.D. Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. 
Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis v. Hannibal 
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1115–16 (E.D. Mo. 2010); Requa v. Kent Sch. 
Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274, 1276 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Flaherty v. Keystone 
Oaks Sch. Dist., 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. 
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 795–96 (N.D. Ohio 2002).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also dealt with 
the issue in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002).  For 
circuit court decisions on the topic, see D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 
60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), 
cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III), 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 342 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 37 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 92. See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet:  Student Speech and the First 
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 380–84 (2007); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 
410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 93. See discussion infra Part II. 
 94. See discussion infra Parts III–IV. 
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es.95  Part VI will conclude that there is a circuit split that requires the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court to be resolved.96
II. FIRST AMENDMENT: STUDENT CYBERSPEECH
A. First Amendment:  What Does It Mean? 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.”97
Protecting speech was so important that it was enshrined in the First 
Amendment of the Bill of Rights.98  The Supreme Court has issued numerous 
opinions discussing this amendment.99  As the Court recently stated in Sny-
der v. Phelps,100 “[t]he First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.’”101  Why?  Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,102 the 
Court noted that free speech “‘is more than self-expression; it is the essence 
of self-government,’”103 while acknowledging that “‘speech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is 
entitled to special protection.’”104
How is Snyder applicable to the student cyberspeech cases?  Besides 
providing the most recent Supreme Court First Amendment analysis, Snyder,
like the school cyberspeech decisions, deals with speech that can be de-
scribed as unkind or cruel.105  The Snyder Court upheld Westboro Baptist’s 
right to picket outside an area near veterans’ funerals with signs that read 
“‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’” “‘Fag Troops,’” “‘Thank God 
for Dead Soldiers,’” and “‘God Hates You.’”106  The Court’s majority opin-
ion concluded: 
 95. See discussion infra Part V. 
 96. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 98. Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death:  The 
Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1108 (2000). 
 99. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011). 
 100. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 101. Id. at 1215 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 102. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
 103. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75). 
 104. Id. at 1215 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)). 
 105. See id. at 1216–17, 1220. 
 106. Id. at 1216–17. 
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 Speech is powerful.  It can stir people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and⎯as it did here—inflict great 
pain.  On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by pun-
ishing the speaker.  As a Nation we have chosen a different 
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure 
that we do not stifle public debate.  That choice requires that we 
shield Westboro . . . .107
How do we apply these principles in the public school setting?  Do stu-
dents and teachers have free speech?  What happens in public schools grades 
K–12 when teachers or principals punish students for speech made or di-
rected at personnel or the students of the school?  Is this speech protected?  
Can schools punish these student speakers even if the speakers “inflict great 
pain?”108
B. Morse Quartet 
The Supreme Court answered the question about students’ speech rights 
in the public school setting in its 1969 decision in Tinker.109 The Court fur-
ther delineated its student speech analysis with three later opinions.110
Grouped together, these four opinions are sometimes referred to as the 
“Morse quartet.”111
Tinker was the first decision of the quartet.112  It involved the now infa-
mous, non-disruptive, black armband worn by Mary Beth Tinker to her 
school to protest the Vietnam War.113  Mary Beth was suspended from school 
until she agreed to no longer wear the armband to school.114  Her parents 
sued on her behalf, arguing the school’s actions violated Mary Beth’s First 
Amendment free speech rights.115  The Tinker Court agreed with Mary Beth, 
stating “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”116 Tinker established the analysis for the punishment of student speech 
as follows: 
 107. Id. at 1220. 
 108. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 110. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 356. 
 111. See id. at 362. 
 112. Id. at 356. 
 113. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 114. Id.
 115. Id. at 504–05. 
 116. Id. at 506. 
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A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if 
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.  But con-
duct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any rea-
son⎯whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.117
Between 1986 and 2007, the Court decided three more student speech 
cases, which limited the holding of Tinker.118 Bethel School District No. 403 
v. Fraser119 allowed schools to punish lewd and offensive speech given at a 
high school assembly to a captive audience,120 while Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. Kuhlmeier121 permitted schools to exercise editorial control over 
speech for pedagogical purposes, which carried the imprimatur of the 
school.122 Morse v. Frederick123 allowed the punishment of student speech 
occurring at a school-sanctioned off-campus event that appeared to advocate 
the use of illegal drugs.124
In 1983, Matthew Fraser was suspended for three days and had his 
name removed from the list of potential graduation speakers because of a 
candidate speech he delivered to a high school assembly.125  In the speech, 
Fraser used a sexual innuendo to refer to one of the candidates running for 
school office.126  The United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
both applying Tinker, held that the school violated Fraser’s First Amendment 
 117. Id. at 512–13 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 118. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see 
also Dickler, supra note 92, at 356. 
 119. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 120. Id. at 685. 
 121. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 122. Id. at 273. 
 123. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 124. Id. at 397, 410. 
 125. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677–78. 
 126. Id.
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rights.127  The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by then Chief 
Justice Burger, reversed, framing the issue as “whether the First Amendment 
prevents a school district from disciplining a high school student for giving a 
lewd speech at a school assembly.”128  Concluding such discipline was al-
lowed, the Court stated: 
The First Amendment guarantees wide freedom in matters of adult 
public discourse. . . .  It does not follow, however, that simply be-
cause the use of an offensive form of expression may not be pro-
hibited to adults making what the speaker considers a political 
point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public 
school. . . .  [T]he constitutional rights of students in public school 
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.  As cogently expressed by Judge Newman, “the First 
Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to 
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”129
Fraser was followed two years later by Kuhlmeier, which involved 
school censorship of a student-edited school newspaper.130  The Court framed 
the issue as “the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control 
over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s 
journalism curriculum.”131  The high school principal deleted two articles 
from the newspaper before it went to print.132  The paper’s student editors 
sued, alleging this censorship violated their First Amendment rights.133
Again, the Court further eroded the holding in Tinker.134  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice White stated: 
[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student 
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their 
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  
This standard is consistent with our oft-expressed view that the 
 127. Id. at 679; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
 128. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 680; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 129. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 130. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
675. 
 131. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 262. 
 132. Id. at 263–64. 
 133. Id. at 264; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 134. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272–73 & n.5 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)). 
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education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of 
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of 
federal judges.135
The Court last addressed student speech in 2007 with its decision in 
Morse,136 completing the series of cases that are sometimes referred to as the
Morse quartet.137 Morse involved off-campus speech at a school-sponsored 
activity.138  The Olympic Torch Relay was scheduled to pass “through Jun-
eau, Alaska, on its way to the winter games in Salt Lake City, Utah.”139  Dur-
ing the procession, the relay was scheduled to pass by Frederick’s high 
school.140  To celebrate and participate, Deborah Morse, school principal, 
allowed teachers and students to leave the school building and attend the 
relay on the city streets as a school-sponsored activity.141  As the television 
cameras rolled by, Joseph Frederick, a student, unfurled a fourteen-foot ban-
ner that proclaimed:  “‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”142  Believing the banner to 
be advocating the use of an illegal drug, marijuana, Morse demanded that 
Frederick lower the banner.143  He refused so she confiscated the banner and 
then suspended him for ten days.144  Frederick sued, alleging Morse’s behav-
ior violated his First Amendment rights.145  He argued his banner was not 
promoting illegal drug use but rather was simply nonsense, designed to catch 
the television cameras’ attention.146  The Court framed the issue as “whether 
a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech 
at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal 
drug use.  We hold that she may.”147  The Court then further explained its 
analysis and holding in Fraser, saying: 
 135. Id. at 262, 273 (footnote omitted) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 208 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975), abrogated on other 
grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 
104 (1968)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 136. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007). 
 137. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380. 
 138. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396–99. 
 139. Id. at 397. 
 140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. Id.
 143. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398. 
 144. Id.
 145. Id. at 399; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 146. Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (quoting Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1117–18 (9th 
Cir.), cert. granted, 549 U.S. 1075 (2006), and rev’d, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)). 
 147. Id. at 403; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles.  First, 
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”  Had Fraser delivered the 
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would 
have been protected.  In school, however, Fraser’s First Amend-
ment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment.”  Second, Fraser established that 
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Whatever 
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “sub-
stantial disruption” analysis proscribed by Tinker.
. . . . 
The case, [Kuhlmeier], is nevertheless instructive because it con-
firms both principles cited above.  Kuhlmeier acknowledged that 
schools may regulate some speech “even though the government 
could not censor similar speech outside the school.”  And, like 
Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only basis for 
restricting student speech.148
None of the above decisions deal with off-campus student cyberspeech; 
yet, these are the decisions that lower federal courts—both district and cir-
cuit—are relying upon to analyze whether school officials can punish off-
campus student cyberspeech.149  As the discussion below indicates, lower 
courts are applying the Morse quartet analysis with varying results.150
C. Circuit Courts:  Split or Reconcilable? 
Between 2007 and 2011, the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits published opinions that dealt with 
off-campus student cyberspeech.151  Two decisions from the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit involved student speech 
 148. Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–06 (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 149. See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 150. See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 151. See D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756 (8th 
Cir. 2011); Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 
F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 
F.3d 334, 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 
F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007).  Other circuit courts have yet to address the explicit issue of off-
campus regulation of student cyberspeech. 
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about school officials.152  The court upheld the school’s punishment of the 
student speech in both cases.153  Meanwhile, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit published two decisions, issued by two different 
panels, on February 4, 2010154 that appeared to reach different results with 
seemingly similar facts.155  A decision from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which punished a student for an in-
ternet profile parody of her high school principal, was upheld.156  However, a 
decision from the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania agreed with a student that his First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was punished for creating a profile parody of his principal 
on MySpace.157  Because this appeared to many observers to reflect a split 
within the Third Circuit, the court re-heard both cases while sitting en 
banc.158  Ultimately, the students prevailed in both cases with the court hold-
ing that school officials had violated the students’ First Amendment rights.159
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit heard a 
case that involved the school’s punishment of a student for offensive cyber-
speech made against another student.160  The court upheld the school’s pun-
ishment of the student.161  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit upheld the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri, agreeing with the court that D.J.M.’s instant messages 
 152. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
 153. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 357–58; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40. 
 154. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290–91 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g 
granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249, 252–54 (3d Cir.), vacated en 
banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 
2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012); Easton, supra note 22, at 17. 
 155. See Easton, supra note 22, at 17. 
 156. J.S ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08; J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 
WL 4279517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 
915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 157. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 587, 591, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en 
banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex
rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 158. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 
(2012). 
 159. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 932, 933; see also Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 
219. 
 160. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012). 
 161. Id. at 577. 
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threatening to get a gun and shoot classmates did constitute “true threats” 
that were not protected by the First Amendment.162
Because similar fact patterns appeared to be involved in the above cas-
es, with differing results reached, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and 
Kowalski I were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, based 
on the argument that a circuit split existed.163  Despite the differing results, 
the Court denied certiorari for all three petitions, leaving the decisions to 
stand.164  Is there a circuit split or can these cases be reconciled?  This section 
will examine and review the decisions. 
The decisions from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit will be reviewed first.  This court has decided two cases, 
Wisniewski and Doninger II, on the subject.165  In both decisions, the court 
upheld the school’s right to punish students for off-campus student cyber-
speech that was ultimately aimed at school officials.166
In Wisniewski, a middle school student, Aaron Wisniewski, was sus-
pended from school because of an instant message he sent classmates from 
his parents’ home computer.167  The message included an instant message 
icon with “a small drawing of a pistol firing a bullet at a person’s head, 
above which were dots representing spattered blood.  Beneath the drawing 
appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen.’  Philip VanderMolen was Aa-
ron’s English teacher at the time.”168  While Aaron did not send the instant 
message icon or message to any school officials, he shared it with some of 
his classmates.169  One of the classmates eventually shared the icon and mes-
sage with Mr. VanderMolen who was reportedly distressed.170  Mr. Vander-
Molen then shared it with school authorities.171  The school shared it with 
“the local police [department], the Superintendent . . . , and Aaron’s par-
ents.”172  When confronted, Aaron admitted he had created the instant mes-
sage and icon—though a police investigator determined that the icon was 
 162. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 756, 757 n.1, 
762 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 163. See discussion infra note 325. 
 164. See discussion infra note 325. 
 165. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 166. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 340, 358; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39–40. 
 167. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
 168. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). 
 169. Id.
 170. Id.
 171. Id.
 172. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
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intended only as a joke.173  Once the severity of the issue was pointed out to 
him, Aaron expressed regret.174  Mr. VanderMolen asked to stop teaching 
Aaron, and this was allowed.175
In the meantime, the police department investigated and questioned Aa-
ron.176  He was referred to a psychologist for testing.177  Based on the testing 
and evaluation, the psychologist concluded the icon was intended as a joke, 
and that Aaron had no violent intent and posed no actual threat.178  The police 
investigation was concluded with no arrest being made, but there was a hear-
ing before the school superintendent.179  At the hearing, the hearing officer 
found that “[s]ubstantial and competent evidence exists that Aaron engaged 
in the act of sending a threatening message to his buddies, the subject of 
which was a teacher.”180  The hearing officer said:  “He admitted it. . . . I 
conclude Aaron did commit the act of threatening a teacher . . . creating an 
environment threatening the health, safety, and welfare of others . . . .”181
Aaron was suspended for a semester.182
Aaron sued, arguing his icon “was protected speech under the First 
Amendment.”183  The court upheld the school’s punishment of Aaron, con-
cluding that the fact that his conduct occurred off-campus did “not necessar-
ily insulate him from school discipline.”184  Instead, the court applied 
Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable risk” test to the facts and concluded that it 
was foreseeable that school authorities would learn of Aaron’s pistol icon.185
It was then foreseeable that the threatening icon would “‘materially and sub-
stantially disrupt’” the school’s work.186
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
heard arguments in Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger I),187 which also involved 
student speech.188  In Doninger I, Avery Doninger was involved in a dispute 
 173. Id.
 174. See id.
 175. Id.
 176. Id.
 177. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
 178. Id.
 179. Id.
 180. Id.
 181. Id. at 36–37. 
 182. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 37. 
 183. Id.
 184. Id. at 39–40 (footnote omitted). 
 185. Id. at 38–39 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007)). 
 186. Id. (quoting Morse, 551 U.S. at 403). 
 187. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 188. See id. at 44–46. 
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with school officials about the scheduling and location of a “battle of the 
bands” known as “Jamfest.”189  Because of personnel issues, Doninger and 
the Student Council were advised that Jamfest would either have to be re-
scheduled for another date or relocated to another facility if the Council was 
determined to adhere to the named date.190  After learning of this, four mem-
bers of the Student Council met in the computer lab and accessed a parent’s 
email account.191  From this email account, the students sent out two mass 
emails to students and parents—one of which included the contact informa-
tion for Paula Schwartz, the district superintendent—advising them to con-
tact the district office and forward the email to as many people as possible to 
see that Jamfest was held as scheduled in the new auditorium.192  Unhappy 
with the decision to cancel Jamfest, Avery Doninger then posted an entry on 
her blog from her home that said: 
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office.  here is an 
email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to forward to 
everyone in their address book to help get support for jamfest.  ba-
sically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a TON of 
phone calls and emails and such.  we have so much support and we 
really appriciate [sic] it.  however, she got pissed off and decided 
to just cancel the whole thing all together [sic].193
Because of the vulgar language of the blog and the manner in which 
Avery expressed disagreement with the school’s administration, Niehoff 
decided that Avery could not run for Senior Class Secretary because 
“Avery’s conduct . . . failed to display the civility and good citizenship ex-
pected of class officers.”194  Avery’s mother sued, arguing Niehoff’s actions 
violated her daughter’s First Amendment rights.195
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit analyzed 
Doninger’s First Amendment claims, it began with Tinker, noting that “stu-
dents do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expres-
sion at the schoolhouse gate.’”196  Yet while Tinker protected students’ 
 189. Id. at 44. 
 190. Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 191. Id.
 192. Id. at 339–40. 
 193. Id. at 340–41 (second alteration in original). 
 194. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 46. 
 195. Id. at 46–47. 
 196. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
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speech rights,197 the court concluded that these rights, in the public school 
setting, were not equal to the free speech rights of adults.198  In fact, the court 
analyzed and discussed the student speech holdings of the Supreme Court 
and concluded that “school administrators [could] prohibit student expres-
sion” when certain circumstances were met.199  Utilizing the “foreseeable 
disruption test” articulated by Tinker, the Doninger I court stated: 
 The Supreme Court has yet to speak on the scope of a school’s 
authority to regulate expression that, like Avery’s, does not occur 
on school grounds or at a school sponsored event.  We have de-
termined, however, that a student may be disciplined for expres-
sive conduct, even conduct occurring off school grounds, when 
this conduct “would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disrup-
tion within the school environment,” at least when it was similarly 
foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach cam-
pus.200
Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
handed down, via two panels, two decisions on school speech cases on Feb-
ruary 4, 2010.201  In two cases, involving seemingly similar facts, the two 
panels reached what appeared to be different results.202  Consequently, the 
Third Circuit sat, en banc, to rehear both cases.203
 197. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 198. Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 344 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675, 682 (1986)). 
 199. Id. at 344 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 200. Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 48 (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). 
 201. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 307–08 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc,
reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. 
denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 202. Easton, supra note 22, at 18; see also Shannon P. Duffy, Do 3rd Circuit Rulings over 
Student Speech on MySpace Pages Contradict?, LAW.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www. 
law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202442025383. 
 203. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  The Court vacated both 
earlier panel opinions.  Id. at 207; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  Shortly after this decision was issued, Daniel J. 
Solove addressed the issue in a blog post.  See Daniel J. Solove, School Discipline for Off-
Campus Speech and the First Amendment, HUFFPOST EDUC. (June 20, 2011, 11:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-j-solove/school-discipline-free-speech_b_877203.html. 
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In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District (Layshock 
II),204 the initial panel comprising Judges McKee, Smith, and Roth,205 framed 
the issue before the court as whether “a school district can punish a student 
for expressive conduct that originated outside of the classroom, when that 
conduct did not disturb the school environment and was not related to any 
school sponsored event.”206  “Justin Layshock, . . . a . . . senior at Hickory 
High School . . . in Hermitage, Pennsylvania,” posted a “‘parody profile’ of 
his [high school] principal, Eric Trosch,” on his MySpace account while at 
his grandmother’s using her computer.207  While Justin copied and pasted Mr. 
Trosch’s photograph from the school’s web site, that is the extent to which a 
school resource was used.208  Justin’s parody gave bogus “big” answers to 
questions he pretended Mr. Trosch answered.209  Justin’s parody stated:
Birthday:  too drunk to remember 
Are you a health freak:  big steroid freak 
In the past month have you smoked:  big blunt 
In the past month have you been on pills:  big pills 
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping:  big lake, not 
big dick 
In the past month have you Stolen Anything:  big keg 
Ever been drunk:  big number of times 
Ever been called a Tease:  big whore 
Ever been Beaten up:  big fag 
Ever Shoplifted:  big bag of kmart 
Number of Drugs I have taken:  big210
Justin shared the profile with his friends at school who then shared the 
profile with many other students.211  Mr. Trosch learned about the profile 
after three other students posted similar profiles, and Mr. Trosch’s eleventh 
grade daughter showed one of them to her father.212  The court noted that the 
profile spread through the school like “wildfire” and that students accessed 
 204. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. 
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 205. Id. at 251. 
 206. Id.
 207. Id. at 252. 
 208. Id.
 209. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252. 
 210. Id. at 252–53. 
 211. Id. at 253. 
 212. Id.
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the profile at school.213  Mr. Trosch explained he found the profile “‘degrad-
ing,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and ‘shocking.’”214  After an investiga-
tion, the school district suspended Justin for ten days, placed him in the Al-
ternative Education Program for his last semester of high school, banned him 
from all extracurricular activities, and refused to allow him to participate in 
his graduation ceremony.215  The school district concluded that Justin had 
violated Hermitage School District’s Discipline Code, finding “[d]isruption 
of the normal school process; [d]isrespect; [h]arassment of a school adminis-
trator via computer/internet with remarks that have demeaning implications; 
[g]ross misbehavior; [o]bscene, vulgar, and profane language; [c]omputer 
[p]olicy violations (use of school pictures without authorization).”216
Justin and his parents sued, arguing that the Hermitage School District 
had violated his First Amendment rights.217  The United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania agreed with Justin, granting him 
summary judgment.218  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit panel published their opinion on February 4, 2010, and affirmed the 
decision of the lower court, holding “schools may punish expressive conduct 
that occurs outside of school as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate’ 
under certain very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.”219
On the same day, February 4, 2010, another panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, comprising of Circuit Judges Fisher 
and Chagares and District Judge Diamond,220 published their opinion in J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder II).221  In 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, J.S., an eighth grader, created a MySpace profile par-
ody of her high school principle, Mr. McGonigle, with another friend, K.L., 
from their home computers.222  As with Layshock II, J.S. and K.L. copied a 
picture of Mr. McGonigle from the school’s web site and pasted it on their 
 213. Id.
 214. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 253. 
 215. Id. at 254. 
 216. Id.
 217. Id. at 254–55. 
 218. Layshock I, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 606 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650 
F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 219. Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 249, 263. 
 220. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d 286, 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g grant-
ed en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).  Judge Diamond, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, was sitting 
on the panel by designation.  Id. at 290 & n.*. 
 221. 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 08-4138, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 222. Id. at 290–91. 
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MySpace parody profile.223  While the profile did not identify McGonigle by 
name or location, it included his school photograph and described him as 
saying: 
HELLO CHILDREN 
yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, 
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick 
PRINCIPAL 
I have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other 
principal’s [sic] to be just like me.  I know, I know, you’re all 
thrilled 
Another reason I came to my space is because⎯I am 
keeping an eye on you students 
(who i care for so much) 
For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school 
I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the 
beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my 
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) 
MY FRAINTRAIN 
so please, feel free to add me, message me whatever.224
J.S. and K.L. left the profile “public” on Sunday night.225  By Monday after-
noon, students at Blue Mountain Middle School had seen the profile and 
were discussing it, so J.S. made the profile “private” when she went home.226
 223. Id. at 291; see also Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252. 
 224. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 291. 
 225. Id. at 292. 
 226. Id.
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On Tuesday, a student at Blue Mountain approached McGonigle and told 
him about the profile.227  After McGonigle viewed the profile, he contacted 
the School Superintendant, Joyce Romberger, and the Director of Technol-
ogy, Susan Schneider-Morgan.228  After meeting and reviewing the profile, 
the three “concluded that it violated the School District’s Acceptable Use 
Policy (AUP) because it violated copyright laws in misappropriating McGo-
nigle’s photograph from the School District’s website without permission.”229
McGonigle then met with J.S. and K.L. and their mothers telling them 
he was suspending them for ten days and also considering legal action.230
While students could not view the profile at school because MySpace was a 
blocked site, McGonigle and other teachers testified that the profile parody 
disrupted school—students chattered about the profile in class and related 
disruptions in the hallways, requiring extra student supervision.231  After the 
suspended students returned to school, they were greeted by fellow class-
mates who had decorated their lockers and offered them written congratula-
tions for their behavior.232
J.S. and her parents sued, arguing the Blue Mountain School District 
had violated her First Amendment rights.233  The United States District Court 
for the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania decided in favor of the school, 
holding that the school did not violate J.S.’s First Amendment rights when 
disciplining her because of the on campus impact of her “lewd and vulgar” 
speech.234  The Third Circuit’s panel affirmed the lower court’s decision.235
According to the court’s panel, Tinker’s foreseeable and material and sub-
stantial disruption test was the appropriate analysis to be applied to the 
facts.236  Certainty regarding a disruption was not required; rather the court 
indicated that the standard was the reasonable foreseeability of disruption 
that schools had to anticipate and protect students from.237  Schools were 
 227. Id.
 228. Id.
 229. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 292. 
 230. Id. at 293. 
 231. Id. at 292, 294. 
 232. Id. at 294. 
 233. Id. at 294–95. 
 234. J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 235. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 307–08.  In this panel opinion, Judge Chagares 
concurred in part with the decision and also dissented in part.  Id. at 308 (Chagares, Cir. J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 236. See id. at 298 (majority opinion). 
 237. See id. at 298–99 (citing Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011); Lowery v. Euverard, 
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required to engage in a balancing analysis, balancing three rights:  The right 
of students to be free from the invasion of their rights, the right of the stu-
dents to avoid a “substantial disruption” at school, and the right of students 
to engage in protected First Amendment speech off-campus which does im-
pact on campus activities.238  Thus, the court appeared to believe that Tinker
required a balancing of the rights of others with the rights of an individual.239
As the court’s panel applied this analysis to the facts of the case, it con-
cluded that a substantial disruption was not created on campus by J.S.’s pro-
file of McGoingle.240  However, given the incendiary nature of the profile, 
i.e. indirectly suggesting that McGoingle engaged in pedophilic behavior 
with his students, the panel concluded that the school’s behavior did not vio-
late J.S.’s First Amendment rights as McGoingle’s actions forestalled the 
threat of future disruptions.241  This, the court indicated, satisfied the Tinker
test.242  The court refused to accept J.S.’s argument that off-campus speech 
could not be regulated by school authorities.243  Instead, it acknowledged the 
way that the evolving technology was blurring the boundaries between 
school and home and stated ‘“[t]erritoriality is not necessarily a useful con-
cept in determining the limit of [school administrators’] authority.”’244
Given the similar facts of both cases, and yet the dissimilar disposi-
tions,245 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed to 
hear the cases en banc and did so in June of 2010.246  A year later, in June of 
2011, the court published both opinions.247
497 F.3d 584, 591–92, 596 (6th Cir. 2007); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 
(9th Cir. 2001)). 
 238. See id. (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); Saxe v. State Coll. Area 
Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 216 n.11 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 239. See id. at 299 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216 n.11); see also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680–81; Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969). 
 240. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 299. 
 241. See id. at 300–03. 
 242. See id. at 298, 300, 303; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 243. J.S. ex rel. Snyder II, 593 F.3d at 301. 
 244. Id. (quoting Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)). 
 245. Compare id. at 290–94, 303, with Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–54, 264 (3d Cir.), 
vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 246. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied 
sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 247. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 915; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 205. 
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Layshock III affirmed and upheld the holding of the initial panel, pub-
lished in February of 2010.248  The en banc court held that the school had 
violated Justin Layshock’s First Amendment rights.249  After reviewing and 
reconciling several cases cited by the school district, including Doninger I
and Wisniewski,250 the Layshock III en banc court concluded that school offi-
cials have very limited authority, according to the application of Tinker and 
Fraser, to punish off-campus student speech.251  Quoting Thomas v. Board of 
Education,252 the court stated that “‘[o]ur willingness to defer to the school-
master’s expertise in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, 
upon the supposition that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the 
schoolhouse gate.’”253  The court said that it was unnecessary to define the 
parameters of school authorities regarding off-campus student speech since 
Justin’s speech clearly did not substantially or materially disrupt the school’s 
activities.254  Without a substantial disruption, Tinker was not applicable.255
The court concluded that while Fraser allowed school authorities to disci-
pline student speech that was “lewd” or “vulgar,” this authority was limited 
to on campus lewd or vulgar speech.256  Discussing the applicability of Fra-
ser, the court stated “Fraser does not allow the School District to punish 
Justin for expressive conduct [that] occurred outside of the school con-
text.”257  This holding seems to be at odds with the court’s holding in J.S. ex 
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District (J.S. ex rel. Snyder III),258
which announced that territoriality was not the defining factor when deter-
 248. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207. 
 249. Id. at 207, 219. 
 250. The Court distinguished the facts in Layshock III from Doninger I and Wisniewski as 
well as other cases.  Id.
 251. Id. at 216, 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007); Layshock I,
496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599–600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012)). 
 252. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 253. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (quoting Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45). 
 254. Id.
 255. Id. at 216; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969). 
 256. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 217 n.17 (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 
F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 
(1986). 
 257. Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 
(2007)). 
 258. Compare id. at 218–19, with J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
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mining the reach of school authorities to regulate off-campus student 
speech.259
In J.S. ex rel Snyder III, the en banc court remanded the decision to the 
district court, reversing in part and affirming in part.260  While the court con-
cluded that the school’s disciplinary policies were not facially unconstitu-
tional, as J.S. and her parents alleged,261 it reversed the holding that the 
school could punish J.S.’s speech.262  Noting that schools could suppress or 
punish student speech in certain situations, the court stated “[t]he authority of 
public school officials is not boundless.”263  The court then engaged in a dis-
cussion as to what the Supreme Court’s basic analysis was when reviewing 
student speech punishment arguments, discussing Tinker’s “substantial dis-
ruption” requirement and noting the further exceptions created by Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse.264
An examination of the court’s analysis indicated that while the court 
acknowledged that a school could suppress or punish student speech in the 
public school setting, in order to prevail in court, “school officials must 
[show] that ‘the forbidden [speech or] conduct would materially and substan-
tially interfere with the . . . appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.’”265
The court noted that schools cannot satisfy this burden if they cannot 
demonstrate more than the “‘desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint.’”266  When examin-
ing the implications and applications of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse, the 
court concluded that if Tinker was not applicable, then there was no need to 
establish a substantial disruption and instead the Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or 
Morse exceptions applied.267  The court said that Fraser allowed schools to 
discipline school speech, categorized as lewd or vulgar, when a captive audi-
 259. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, Cir. J., concurring).
 260. Id. at 915, 936.  As with the en banc opinion published in Layshock III, this opinion 
involved a concurrence.  Id. at 936; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219.  It also included a dissent.  
J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 941. 
 261. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 936. 
 262. Id. at 933 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)). 
 263. Id. at 925–26 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
507 (1969)). 
 264. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
685; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926–27 (citing Morse v. Fre-
derick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 
(3d Cir. 2001)). 
 265. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 926 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
 266. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
 267. See id. at 926–27 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Saxe, 240 
F.3d at 213–14). 
29
Smith-Butler: Walking the Regulatory Tightrope: Balancing Bullies' Free Speech
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
272 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
ence was involved,268 while Kuhlmeier allowed discipline, for pedagogical 
reasons of school sponsored speech.269  If neither of those categories were 
applicable, Morse then established that speech which advocated illegal drug 
use, even if off-campus but at a school sponsored event, could also be pun-
ished.270  Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the court concluded 
that none of the exceptions articulated by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse were 
applicable.271  Thus, Tinker would be the only standard by which the school 
could punish J.S.’s speech.272  However, the court concluded that the school 
did not meet the “substantial disruption” test of Tinker, as the school had 
conceded in the district court that no substantial disruption occurred.273  Fur-
thermore, the court said that J.S.’s profile of McGonigle “was so outrageous 
that no one could [or would] have taken it seriously . . . [t]hus it was . . . not 
reasonably foreseeable” that a “substantial disruption” would occur.274  In 
this way, the court concluded that J.S. ex rel Snyder III was distinguishable 
from Doninger I and Wisnieswki.275
The Fourth Circuit also addressed this issue in July of 2011 with its de-
cision in Kowalski I.276  Kara Kowalski, then a senior at Musselman High 
School, created a MySpace page at home with her home computer, naming 
the page “‘S.A.S.H.,’” which stated, “‘No No Herpes, We don’t want no 
herpes.’”277  She invited one hundred or so of her friends to join the group 
page; of this number, approximately two-dozen were students from Mussel-
man High.278  A friend and classmate at Musselman High, Ray Parsons, 
joined the group the day the page was created.279  He then uploaded a picture 
of himself, holding his nose with a sign that said “‘Shay Has Herpes.’”280
This was a reference to another Musseleman High classmate, Shay N.281
 268. Id. at 927 (citing Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213). 
 269. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing 
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 214). 
 270. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 927 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408). 
 271. Id. at 932, 932 n.10, 933. 
 272. Id. at 931–32. 
 273. Id. at 928. 
 274. Id. at 930. 
 275. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 931 n.8; see also Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 
(2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 
(2011); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 276. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012). 
 277. Id. at 567. 
 278. Id.
 279. Id. at 568. 
 280. Id.
 281. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68. 
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss2/2
2013] WALKING THE REGULATORY TIGHTROPE 273
According to the court, Parsons “had drawn red dots on Shay N.’s face to 
simulate herpes and added a sign near her pelvic region, that read, 
‘[w]arning:  Enter at your own risk.’”282  “In the second photograph, he cap-
tioned Shay N.'s face with a sign that read, ‘portrait of a whore.’”283  Shay N. 
learned of the page later that evening.284  Her father contacted Parsons, ex-
pressing his anger.285  Parsons contacted Kowalski, who tried to take the page 
down but was not able to remove it.286
The next day, Shay N. and her parents went to Musselman High School 
where they met with Vice Principal Becky Harden.287  They filed a complaint 
of harassment with the school, and Shay then returned home, missing school 
because she was uncomfortable attending classes with students who had 
posted comments about her on Kowalski’s MySpace page.288  Ronald Ste-
phens, the school’s Principal, “contacted the central school board . . . to de-
termine whether” this was the type of behavior that should subject students 
to school discipline.289  The office responded affirmatively, so the school 
then conducted an investigation, interviewing the students involved with 
creating, posting to, and viewing the website.290  After the investigation, the 
school “concluded that Kowalski had created a ‘hate website’” that was in 
violation of the Berkeley Board of Education’s Harassment, Bullying and 
Intimidation Policy and its Student Code of Conduct.291  The harassment 
policy defined bullying as 
“[A]ny intentional gesture, or any intentional written, verbal or 
physical act that” 
1.  A reasonable person under the circumstances should 
know will have the effect of: 
a.  Harming a student or staff member; 
. . . 
 282. Id. at 568. 
 283. Id.
 284. See id. 
 285. Id.
 286. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568. 
 287. Id.
 288. Id.
 289. Id.
 290. Id.
 291. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 568–69. 
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2.  Is sufficiently inappropriate, severe, persistent, or per-
vasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abu-
sive educational environment for a student.292
“The Student Code of Conduct [required], ‘[a]ll students . . . shall behave in 
a safe manner that promotes a school environment that is nurturing, orderly, 
safe, and conducive to learning and personal-social development.’”293  Viola-
tors of either policy were subject to various punishments—one such punish-
ment was a ten-day suspension.294  Applying the harassment and conduct 
policies to the facts, Stephens and Harden then “suspended Kowalski from 
school for 10 days and issued . . . a 90-day ‘social suspension’” from school 
extracurricular activities.295
Kowalski sued, arguing that the school had violated her First Amend-
ment free speech rights.296  She argued that the school had disciplined her for 
“‘off-campus, non-school related speech’” for which it had neither the right 
nor the authority to punish her.297  The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia disagreed,298 and Kowalski appealed its 
ruling to the Fourth Circuit.299
The Fourth Circuit defined the issue facing it as “whether Kowalski’s 
activity fell within the outer boundaries of the high school’s legitimate inter-
est in maintaining order in the school and protecting the well-being and edu-
cational rights of its students.”300  Concluding it did, the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision, upholding the school’s punishment of Kowalski.301
While acknowledging that “[t]here is surely a limit to the scope of a high 
school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-being of its students when the 
speech . . . originates outside the schoolhouse gate,”302 the court concluded 
that “the language of Tinker supports the conclusion that . . . schools have a 
‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or disrupts the 
work and discipline of the school, including discipline for student harassment 
 292. Id. at 569 (alteration in original). 
 293. Id.
 294. Id.
 295. Id. at 568–69. 
 296. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570. 
 297. Id. at 570–71. 
 298. See Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 3:07-CV-147 (N.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 2009), ECF No. 37. 
 299. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 570. 
 300. Id. at 571. 
 301. Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 
(1969); Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 
334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011)). 
 302. Id. at 573. 
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and bullying.”303  The court stated that while the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States had not yet dealt with a case in which one student targeted another 
student for verbal abuse, it felt certain that Tinker would permit discipline for 
such speech as it “‘disrupts classwork,’ creates ‘substantial disorder,’ or ‘col-
lid[es] with’ or ‘inva[des]’ ‘the rights of others.’”304  According to the court, 
the fact that the student speech involved occurred off-campus was not deter-
minative of the ability of school administrators to impose discipline.305  Ra-
ther, the court stressed that Tinker permitted the school’s discipline because 
Tinker allowed schools to intervene where student speech “materially and 
substantially” interfered with school work and invaded the rights of others 
“to be let alone.”306  Since Kowalski’s speech targeted a classmate, the court 
proclaimed that it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would im-
pact students while at school and create substantial disruption.307
The last circuit court decision involved school discipline of a student for 
off-campus speech that was eventually held to constitute a true threat.308
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit.309  This case differs from Wisniewski, Doninger I, Lay-
shock II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and Kowalaski in that it involved behavior by 
a student that did appear to constitute a true threat of physical violence 
against other students.310  While the other five decisions involved off-campus 
student speech directed at school personnel or students whose behavior was 
disliked, D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved behavior that was perceived to consti-
tute an actual threat to the physical well-being of school personnel and stu-
dents.311
 303. Id. at 572 (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 304. Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 571–72 (alteration in original) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
513). 
 305. Id. at 574. 
 306. Id. at 573–74 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 513). 
 307. Id. at 574. 
 308. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 764 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 309. Id. at 755. 
 310. Compare id. at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder 
III, 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and
Layshock II, 593 F.3d 249, 252–53 (3d Cir.), vacated en banc, reh’g granted en banc, No. 07-
4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Moun-
tain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012), and Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–
46 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
499 (2011), and Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 311. Compare D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 756–59, with Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567–
68, and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 920, and Layshock II, 593 F.3d at 252–53, and 
Doninger I, 527 F.3d at 44, and Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36. 
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D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. involved a decision in which a student, D.J.M., was 
chatting via instant message with another classmate, C.M.312  During the 
chat, D.J.M. told C.M. that he was going to get a gun and kill certain class-
mates.313  He named specific students that he would “get rid of.”314  Named 
individuals included “a particular boy along with his older brother and some 
individual members of groups he did not like, namely ‘midget[s],’ ‘fags,’ and 
‘negro bitches.’”315  Concerned, C.M. contacted a school administrator, for-
warding D.J.M’s emails.316  This resulted in D.J.M. being arrested by the 
police and detained in the psychiatric ward of the Lakeland Regional Hospi-
tal for a month.317  After his release from the hospital, D.J.M. attempted to 
return to school, but he was initially suspended for ten days for making true 
threats.318  After numerous parents expressed concern and demanded action, 
a school board hearing resulted in the suspension of D.J.M. for the remainder 
of the school year.319
While D.J.M. argued that the school suspension violated his First 
Amendment free speech rights, the school disputed this, arguing that 
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which violated the school’s conduct 
policy and was not protected by the First Amendment.320  The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that “the evidence 
before the [c]ourt is that school was substantially disrupted because of Plain-
tiff’s threats.  Under the Tinker test, Defendants could punish Plaintiff for his 
disruptive statements without violating his First Amendment rights.”321  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower 
court’s decision, concluding that “[t]rue threats are not protected under the 
First Amendment . . . [H]ere [the school] was given enough information that 
it reasonably feared D.J.M. had access to a handgun and was thinking about 
shooting specific classmates at the high school.”322
Three of the above decisions, Doninger II, J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, and 
Kowalski I, were appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States during 
 312. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 757. 
 313. Id. at 758. 
 314. Id.
 315. Id. (alteration in original). 
 316. Id. at 759. 
 317. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 759. 
 318. Id.
 319. Id.
 320. Id. at 759–60. 
 321. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 
2010). 
 322. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M., 647 F.3d at 764. 
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the 2011–2012 term.323  Despite what appears to be confusion, or what some 
would term a circuit split,324 the Court denied certiorari in all three cases.325
 323. See generally Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 324. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 1; see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, A Need 
to Sharpen the Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 EDUC. L. REP. 21, 36 (2011). 
 325. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder (J.S. ex rel. Snyder IV), 132 S. Ct. 
1097, 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. (Kowalski II), 132 S. Ct. 1095, 1095 
(2012); Doninger v. Niehoff (Doninger III), 132 S. Ct. 499, 499 (2011). In her petition to the 
Supreme Court for certiorari, Avery Doninger, citing Layshock I and J.S. ex rel. Snyder III,
among other cases, argued that the “divergent holdings [among the Second and Third Circuits] 
represent[ed] an actual concrete split . . . which this Court should resolve sooner rather than 
later.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, 16, Doninger v. Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011) 
(No. 11-113).  Meanwhile, Niehoff, in the Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, argued that 
Doninger’s behavior satisfied the Tinker standard of “substantial disruption” and denied that a 
conflict between the circuits existed.  Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 20–22, Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011) (No. 11-113).  Blue Mountain School District also filed a 
petition, requesting certiorari.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. 
v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502).  Citing both the en banc and panel 
decisions of the Third Circuit, Blue Mountain argued there was not only a circuit split, but 
also a deepening split within the Third Circuit.  Id. at 1, 14.  The school also argued that lower 
district courts were split on the issue as to whether Tinker’s standard applied to student speech 
that originated off-campus.  Id. at 15.  Interestingly enough, J.S./Snyder’s respondent’s Brief 
in Opposition argued, as did the school’s brief in Doninger III, that there was no split among 
the courts as they applied Tinker to off-campus student speech.  See Brief in Opposition at 2, 
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-502).  Kow-
alski too petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, arguing, as did the 
Blue Mountain School District, that there was a split among the courts as to whether Tinker
applied to off-campus speech not directed at the school.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2–
3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  She also requested 
that the Court clarify the meaning of Tinker’s “substantial disruption” test.  See id.  Berkeley 
School District responded, arguing—as did the student J.S. in J.S. ex rel. Snyder—that there 
was no circuit court split and that the Fourth Circuit had applied the First Amendment analysis 
as intended.  Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 30, Kowalski v. Berke-
ley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  The Marion B. Brechner First Amend-
ment Project, the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute, and the Rutherford Institute all 
filed amicus curiae briefs to support Kowalski, urging the Court to hear the case and clarify 
the analysis.  See Motion for Leave to File Brief in Support of Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari 
and Brief of Amicus Curiae Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at 1–2, Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461); Motion for Leave to File Brief as 
Amici Curiae and Brief for the Alliance Defense Fund and Liberty Institute as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 2–3, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 
11-461); Motion of the Rutherford Institute for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief and 
Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner at 2, 14, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 132 S. 
Ct. 1095 (2012) (No. 11-461).  The Court denied certiorari in all three cases.  J.S. ex rel. Sny-
der IV, 132 S. Ct. at 1097; Kowalski II, 132 S. Ct. at 1095; Doninger III, 132 S. Ct. at 499. 
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D. District Courts:  More Confusion? 
If the decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits appear confusing and inconsistent,326
an examination of nine decisions rendered by various United States District 
Courts across the country from 2002 to 2011 and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reveals more inconsistency.  This section will review eight cases de-
cided by United States District Courts, in reverse chronological order, as well 
as a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that involved school 
discipline of what originated as off-campus student cyberspeech. 
Most recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana issued an opinion in T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community 
School Corporation.327  In T.V. ex rel. B.V., several teenage girls at Churu-
busco High School, who played on the school’s volleyball team, held slum-
ber parties.328  At these parties, T.V. and other girls posed for various pictures 
that the court described as “raunchy.”329
The girls posted pictures of themselves on Facebook, MySpace, and 
Photo Bucket licking “phallic-shaped rainbow colored lollipops,” holding 
trident-shaped objects from their crotches, putting them in their buttocks, and 
kneeling beside one another “as if engaging in anal sex.”330  The pictures 
came to the attention of other classmates who also played on the volleyball 
team.331  Some classmates disapproved and then showed the web pages to 
their parents.332  Some parents then contacted the school to complain about 
T.V. and M.K. being allowed to play on the volleyball team.333  After review-
ing the school’s extracurricular policy, which required that students “‘dem-
onstrate good conduct at school and outside of school,’”334 the school sus-
pended T.V. and M.K. from participating in extracurricular activities, i.e. 
playing on the volleyball team, for part of the school year.335  While the girls 
argued that the school was violating their First Amendment rights, the school 
stated, “‘[t]he basis for the suspension was the determination that the photo-
 326. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 327. 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 328. Id. at 771. 
 329. Id.
 330. Id. at 772. 
 331. See id.
 332. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
 333. Id. at 772–73. 
 334. Id. at 773 (“‘If you act in a manner in school or out of school that brings discredit or 
dishonor upon yourself or your school, you may be removed from extracurricular activi-
ties.’”).
 335. Id. at 773–74. 
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graphs were inappropriate, and that by posing for them and posting them on 
the internet, the students were reflecting discredit upon the school.’”336  Ac-
knowledging that “the speech in this case doesn’t exactly call to mind high-
minded civic discourse about current events,”337 the court agreed with T.V. 
that her First Amendment rights had been violated.338  After concluding that 
T.V.’s photographs were indeed speech protected by the First Amendment,339
the court then rejected the school’s argument that the photographs were ob-
scene and constituted child pornography.340  Having concluded that the 
speech was protected, the court then applied Fraser and Tinker to determine 
whether T.V.’s posting of photographs on Facebook could be punished by 
school officials.341  Since the speech was off-campus, the court concluded 
that Fraser was not applicable.342  Concluding that Tinker was the appropri-
ate standard to be applied, the court noted that Tinker’s “substantial disrup-
tion” test was not met.343  The court stated that “no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the photos of T.V. and M.K. posted on the internet caused a 
substantial disruption to school activities, or that there was a reasonably fore-
seeable chance of future substantial disruption” since only a few parents had 
complained.344  The court noted that “substantial disruption” required “‘more 
than the ordinary personality conflicts among’” school children.345
In 2010, three student cyberspeech cases, Evans v. Bayer,346 J.C. ex rel. 
R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District,347 and Mardis v. Hannibal Pub-
lic School District No. 60,348 involved school punishment of students for off-
campus cyberspeech.349  Stretching from coast to coast and including the 
 336. Id. at 774. 
 337. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 771. 
 338. Id. at 790. 
 339. Id. at 776. 
 340. Id. at 778. 
 341. Id. at 779–80; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 685 
(1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
 342. T.V. ex rel. B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., 
concurring)). 
 343. Id. at 783–84 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514). 
 344. Id. at 784. 
 345. See id. (quoting J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 
1094, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2010)). 
 346. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 347. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 348. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010).  Mardis was appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where an opinion was issued.  D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2011).  For a discussion of the 
case and the opinion of the Eighth Circuit, see infra, notes 381–91. 
 349. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
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heartland, the decisions ranged in geography, from the Southern District of 
Florida to the Central District of California, with a stop in Missouri to dem-
onstrate student cyberspeech was an issue across America rather than just an 
urban bi-coastal problem.350
The Evans decision involved Katherine Evans, a high school senior at 
Pembroke Pines Charter School, who created a Facebook page and named it 
“Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”351  She invited stu-
dents “to express your feelings of hatred” about Ms. Phelps at the site.352
While “[t]he page included Ms. Phelps’ photograph,” it “did not contain 
threats of violence.”353  Students posted to the site, in support of Ms. Phelps 
while dismissing Evans’ comments.354  Two days later, Evans removed the 
post, but the posting still came to Peter Bayer’s attention.355  Bayer, the high 
school principal, reviewed the post and concluded that Evans had violated 
the school policy regarding “‘Bullying/Cyberbullying/Harassment towards a 
staff member’ and ‘Disruptive behavior.’”356  Because of this, he suspended 
Evans for three days and removed her from her advanced placement clas-
ses.357
Evans sued, arguing she was punished by the school for exercising her 
First Amendment speech rights.358  The court framed the issued as “whether 
the fact that Plaintiff’s speech was arguably aimed at a particular audience at 
the school is enough by itself to label the speech on-campus speech.”359
Analyzing the facts under Tinker and applying the Morse quartet’s holdings, 
the court found that Evans’s First Amendment rights had been violated, con-
cluding, “Evans’s speech falls under the wide umbrella of protected speech.  
It was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published off-
campus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd, vulgar, 
threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.”360
 350. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1094; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1365; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; see also Bullying Statistics 2010, BULLYING STAT.,
http://www.bullyingstatistics.org/content/bullying-statistics-2010.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2013). 
 351. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 352. Id.
 353. Id.
 354. Id.
 355. Id.
 356. Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. 
 357. Id.
 358. Id. at 1368. 
 359. Id. at 1371. 
 360. Id. at 1374; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
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J.C. ex rel. R.C. involved student on student misbehavior.361  In J.C. ex 
rel. R.C., J.C. and several of her classmates went to a restaurant after school 
ended.362  While there, they discussed and made comments about class-
mates.363  A classmate, C.C., who was not present at the restaurant, was 
called a “‘slut,’” “‘spoiled,’” and “‘the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in 
my whole life.’”364  While this conversation ensued, J.C. recorded it with her 
video camera.365  After she went home, she then uploaded the four and a half 
minute video rant against C.C. and posted it on YouTube.366  She invited five 
to ten students from Beverly Hills High to view it.367  J.C. also contacted 
C.C. directly, telling her to view it.368  C.C. viewed it, was upset, and took 
her mother in to complain to the principal the next day.369  The students who 
viewed the video did so from their homes with home computers since access 
to YouTube was blocked at school.370  The school investigated and consulted 
“the [local] Director of Pupil Personnel for the District.”371  The director in-
dicated that the student could be suspended; the school then suspended J.C. 
for two days.372
J.C. sued the school district, arguing the school “violated her First 
Amendment rights.”373  The school district disagreed, arguing J.C.’s conduct 
caused a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.374  The court re-
viewed and examined Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, concluding 
that Tinker’s analysis governed.375  The court rejected J.C.’s “geography-
based argument,” holding that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-
campus student speech.”376  In its analysis, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of the “substantial disruption” test in determining whether schools 
could regulate off-campus student speech.377  Applying Tinker to the facts of 
 361. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 362. Id.
 363. Id.
 364. Id.
 365. Id.
 366. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098. 
 367. Id.
 368. Id.
 369. Id.
 370. See id. at 1099. 
 371. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1099. 
 372. Id.
 373. Id. at 1097, 1100. 
 374. See id. at 1119. 
 375. Id. at 1103, 1109–10. 
 376. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–08. 
 377. Id. at 1104, 1107–08. 
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the case, the court concluded that J.C.’s conduct was “too de minimis . . . to 
constitute a substantial disruption.”378  Rather Tinker’s “substantial disrup-
tion” required “something more than the ordinary personality conflicts 
among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt or 
insecure.”379  Thus, the school could not punish J.C.’s speech since it failed 
to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.380
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later 
weighed in and upheld the lower court’s decision in D.J.M. ex rel. D.M.,381
this section will offer a brief discussion of the decision in the case from the 
lower court.  Mardis came out of Missouri.382  It involved an off-campus 
student instant message exchange between D.J.M. and a classmate, Carly 
Moore.383  During the chat, D.J.M. told Moore “that he was going to get a 
gun and kill certain classmates.”384  Moore was truly concerned so she con-
tacted a school administrator.385  The police then arrested D.J.M. and de-
tained him in the psychiatric ward at Lakeland Regional Hospital.386  Once 
released, D.J.M. was initially suspended for ten days for making threats.387
The superintendent then extended his suspension for the remainder of the 
school year.388
Angry, D.J.M. sued the school district, arguing that his instant messages 
did not constitute “true threats,” and thus the school’s suspension violated his 
First Amendment free speech.389  The school disputed this, arguing that 
D.J.M.’s speech constituted a true threat, which was not protected by the 
First Amendment.390  The court agreed with the school district.391
In 2007, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington dealt with off-campus student cyberspeech in Requa v. Kent 
School District No. 415.392  Gregory Requa was a high school junior at Ken-
 378. Id. at 1117. 
 379. Id. at 1119. 
 380. Id. at 1122. 
 381. D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 767 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
 382. Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1114 (E.D. Mo. 
2010). 
 383. Id. at 1115. 
 384. Id.
 385. Id. at 1122. 
 386. Id. at 1115. 
 387. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1115–16. 
 388. Id. at 1116. 
 389. Id. at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 390. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 391. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. 
 392. 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
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tridge High School when he allegedly “surreptitiously” recorded his high 
school teacher in her classroom.393  While standing behind Ms. M., Requa 
made faces, put up rabbit ears, “and ma[de] pelvic thrusts in her general di-
rection.”394  He filmed the teacher’s buttocks and referred to them as “boo-
ty.”395  He then edited the recording, adding commentary about the teacher’s 
hygiene.396  He uploaded and posted the recording to YouTube, where it lan-
guished until a local Seattle news station did a story about high school stu-
dents who posted videos to YouTube that were critical of teachers.397  During 
the development of this story, the reporter “contacted the Kentridge admini-
stration for comment.”398  The news station then included Requa’s YouTube 
clip in its broadcast to the Seattle area.399
The school then conducted an investigation to satisfy its administrative 
policies and determine which student, either Requa or S.W., had made the 
recordings.400  Requa denied that he had been involved in the “filming, edit-
ing or posting [of] the video,” but four unnamed students disputed this.401
The school then suspended Requa for forty days, indicating his suspension 
resulted from the filming of Ms. M. in class.402  The school’s handbook pro-
hibited “sexual harassment” and the school concluded that the pelvic thrusts 
and shots of Ms. M’s buttocks constituted sexual harassment.403  After a 
school hearing and an appeal to the Board of Directors, the punishment was 
upheld.404
Requa sued, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights and argu-
ing that he had a right to criticize his teacher.405  The school district again 
affirmed its defense, which was that Requa was punished for his behavior in 
class, i.e., “secretly filming the teacher,” rather than his internet posting.406
The court established that Tinker’s “substantial disruption” was the applica-
ble test to determine whether Requa’s in-class behavior was protected 
 393. Id. at 1274. 
 394. Id.
 395. Id.
 396. Id.
 397. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1274. 
 398. Id.
 399. Id.
 400. Id.
 401. Id.
 402. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–76. 
 403. Id.
 404. Id.
 405. See id. at 1273, 1276, 1279. 
 406. Id. at 1277. 
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speech.407  Examining Requa’s behavior, which consisted of standing behind 
a teacher in class and filming her while “making ‘rabbit ears’ and pelvic 
thrusts,” the court concluded that Requa’s behavior satisfied Tinker’s “sub-
stantial disruption” test.408  Thus, his speech was unlikely to be “protected 
speech” within the meaning of Tinker.409  Ultimately the school prevailed, as 
the court noted that Requa’s “admitted free speech activities outside the 
classroom—posting a link to the YouTube video on the internet—are pro-
tected speech and the school district agrees that he may not be disciplined for 
[his] out-of-school expression of his viewpoint.”410  This is an example of the 
existing confusion about the application of Tinker to off-campus student cy-
berspeech.  While the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California says that Tinker is applicable to off-campus student speech that 
arrives on campus,411 the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Washington indicates that Tinker is not applicable to off-campus student 
speech.412
In 2003, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania confronted an off-campus student cyberspeech issue in Flaher-
ty v. Keystone Oaks School District.413  “Jack Flaherty, Jr. posted three mes-
sages from . . . home and one from school” to a public message board dis-
cussing, in juvenile terms, his school’s volleyball team.414  Once the school 
coaches learned of the postings, Flaherty was disciplined based on a policy 
that defined harassment as “any ongoing pattern of abuse, whether physical 
or verbal.”415  Flaherty sued, arguing the school policies used to punish his 
off-campus conduct and speech were overreaching and “unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague [so] that they fail to limit a school official’s authority to 
discipline.”416  Examining the school’s policy in light of the mandates of 
Tinker, the court concluded that the discipline policy was both overbroad and 
 407. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
 408. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 409. Id. at 1279 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513). 
 410. Id. at 1283. 
 411. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1094, 
1105, 1107–08 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 412. Requa, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 1272, 1283. 
 413. 247 F. Supp. 2d 698, 698, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 414. Id. at 700. 
 415. Id. at 700, 701 & n.3. 
 416. Id. at 701, 705. 
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vague in its definition and application.417  The court announced that the pol-
icy failed to follow Tinker’s mandate and limit the authority of the school to 
discipline student expression except in cases of “substantial disruption.”418
Instead, the court stated that the discipline policy “could be interpreted to 
prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech.”419  Thus, the court granted 
Flaherty’s motion for summary judgment.420
In 2002, two federal district court cases involved student cyberspeech, 
as did a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.421 Coy ex rel. Coy v. 
Board of Education422 involved a middle school student named Jon Coy.423
While at home, using his own computer, Coy created a website, posting “pic-
tures and biographical information” about himself and some of his school 
friends.424  The site also contained a section named “losers” and included 
pictures of classmates with derogatory sentences under the photos.425  Spe-
cifically, “[t]he ‘losers’ section contained the pictures of three boys who at-
tended the North Canton Middle School. . . .  Most objectionable was a sen-
tence describing one boy as being sexually aroused by his mother.”426  Mid-
dle school students learned of the website and eventually reported it to the 
math teacher, who reported it to the principal, Mr. Stanley.427  Nothing was 
done until Coy accessed the website from the school’s computer lab.428  After 
that, Stanley suspended Coy for four days for violating the school’s student 
conduct code and internet policy.429 The school found that Coy violated the 
following portion of the student conduct code:  “‘Inappropriate Action or 
Behavior:  Any action or behavior judged by school officials to be inappro-
priate and not specifically mentioned in other sections shall be in violation of 
the Student Conduct Code.’”430
 417. Id. at 704, 705; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969). 
 418. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 704; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 419. Flaherty, 247 F. Supp. 2d at 706. 
 420. Id.
 421. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2002); 
Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794–95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); J.S. ex rel.
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002). 
 422. 205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
 423. Id. at 794. 
 424. Id. at 795. 
 425. Id.
 426. Id.
 427. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 795. 
 428. Id. at 795–96. 
 429. Id. at 796. 
 430. Id. 
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Coy and his parents sued.431  Coy argued that the school disciplined 
him, not for viewing the website at school, but rather for the content of the 
website, which was created off-campus and thus constituted protected speech 
under Tinker.432  The school disputed this, saying that it punished Coy be-
cause he violated school policy.433  Discussing both Tinker’s and Fraser’s
requirements, the court refused to grant the school summary judgment, indi-
cating that it must demonstrate a substantial disruption in order to discipline 
Coy’s speech.434
In November of 2002, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan also dealt with a student cyberspeech issue in Mahaffey 
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich.435  Joshua Mahaffey, a high school student, cre-
ated a website with another student and named it ‘“Satan’s web page.’”436
The site stated “‘[s]tab someone for no reason then set them on fire throw 
them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath, just before 
everything goes black, spit on their face.  Killing people is wrong don’t do It 
[sic]. unless [sic] Im [sic] there to watch.’”437
A parent of another student at the school learned of the web site and re-
ported it to the police.438  The police investigated and were told that com-
puters at the high school “‘may have been used to create the website.’”439
The police then notified the school.440  The school then began an investiga-
tion, and Mahaffey indicated that he created the website “‘for laughs’” and 
because he was “bored.”441  The school’s investigation centered upon Ma-
haffey’s conduct that was alleged to violate the school’s code of conduct.442
After the investigation, the principal, Carol Baldwin, recommended expul-
sion because Mahaffey’s behavior violated the school’s Conduct Policy 
which prohibited “‘[b]ehavior [d]angerous to [the] [s]elf and [o]thers.’”443
 431. Id. at 794. 
 432. Coy ex rel. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 794, 797 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 433. Id. at 794, 796. 
 434. Id. at 799–801. 
 435. 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 779, 781–82 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 436. Id. at 781. 
 437. Id. at 782. 
 438. Id.
 439. Id.
 440. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782. 
 441. Id. at 781. 
 442. Id. at 782. 
 443. Id.  The school advised Mahaffey that “‘based upon the admitted and alleged viola-
tion of Categories 5-Behavior Dangerous to Self and Others, 23-Internet Violations and 24-
Intimidation and Threats of the Waterford School District Code of Conduct’” he was being 
expelled.  Id.
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The school then recommended expulsion but offered to provide a hearing.444
Mahaffey sued, arguing that the school’s conduct violated his First Amend-
ment rights.445  The court, applying the Tinker analysis, agreed with Ma-
haffey.446  When analyzing and applying Tinker, the court concluded that 
Mahaffey’s activity had to have occurred on or with school property in order 
for the school to have taken action.447  In addition to the geography require-
ment, the Tinker test would require that Mahaffey’s behavior must then have 
created a substantial disruption to the work of the school.448  Only after estab-
lishing this could the school discipline Mahaffey for his speech.449  Applying 
Tinker to the facts at hand, the court announced that the school produced no 
evidence that Mahaffey used school equipment to make his website nor had 
it established that Mahaffey communicated its existence to others at the 
school.450  It stated: 
[R]egulation of Plaintiff’s speech on the website without any proof 
of disruption to the school or on campus activity in the creation of 
the website was a violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.  
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment shall be 
granted on his free speech and free expression claims.451
The last case to be discussed in this section involved a decision handed 
down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem 
Area School District452 in 2002.453  J.S., an eighth grade student, created a 
website on his home computer, from home, and titled it “Teacher Sux.”454  It 
made derogatory comments about the school’s algebra teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, 
and the school principal.455  On the website, J.S. posted a question that asked 
“‘Why Should She Die?’”456  Beneath the heading, J.S. then requested “‘$20 
to help pay for the hitman.’”457  In addition to other comments and diagrams, 
 444. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 782–83. 
 445. Id. at 781. 
 446. See id. at 784, 786. 
 447. See id. at 783–84.  
 448. Id. at 784 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)). 
 449. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 784. 
 450. Id. at 786. 
 451. Id.
 452. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 453. Id. at 847. 
 454. Id. at 850–51. 
 455. Id. at 851. 
 456. Id.
 457. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 851. 
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the final page of the website showed a “drawing of Mrs. Fulmer with her 
head cut off and blood dripping from her neck.”458  Students, faculty, and 
administrators at the school viewed the website.459  Mrs. Fulmer testified that 
the website frightened her, and that she was afraid “someone would try to 
kill her.”460  She went on medical leave which meant that three substitute 
teachers had to finish teaching her class, creating a substantial disruption in 
the educational process.461
While the school knew of the website before the school year ended in 
May, it did not take action until July.462  In July, the school notified J.S. and 
his parents that he would be suspended for three days.463  Why was he being 
suspended?  The school said “that J.S. violated School District policy [with 
a] threat to a teacher, harassment of a teacher and principal, and disrespect to 
a teacher and principal, each resulting in actual harm to the health, safety, 
and welfare of the school community.”464  The school district conducted a 
hearing and then suspended J.S. for ten days.465  Shortly thereafter, it ex-
pelled J.S.466
J.S. then appealed the district’s decision.467  The Court of Common 
Pleas affirmed the school’s discipline and the Commonwealth Court upheld 
their decision.468  J.S. then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.469
While J.S. argued that the school’s behavior violated his First Amendment 
rights, the school disagreed, saying that J.S.’s speech was not entitled to First 
Amendment protection since it constituted a true threat.470  As the court ana-
lyzed the facts, it agreed with J.S. that his speech did not constitute a true 
threat since the school failed to take action for several months after learning 
about the website.471  Thus, the court concluded that the Tinker analysis was 
appropriate.472  As the court understood Tinker, it believed that it must first 
determine whether the speech occurred on-campus as it appeared to believe 
 458. Id.
 459. Id. at 851–52. 
 460. Id. at 852. 
 461. Id.
 462. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850, 852. 
 463. Id. at 852. 
 464. Id.
 465. Id.
 466. Id. at 853. 
 467. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 853. 
 468. Id. at 869. 
 469. Id. at 847, 853. 
 470. Id. at 855–56. 
 471. Id. at 860. 
 472. See J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 867–68. 
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that Tinker was inapplicable to off-campus student speech.473  Determining 
that J.S. had accessed the website while at school from school computers, the 
court concluded that the nexus between off-campus speech and on-campus 
access was satisfied.474  Lastly, the court had to determine whether J.S.’s 
speech created a “substantial disruption” as required by Tinker.475  Given the 
nature of the statements made on the website, the court announced that the 
uproar generated by students, parents, and school staff because of the website 
did indeed result in a substantial disruption in the work of the school.476  Ap-
plying the Tinker analysis, the court announced that the school did not vio-
late J.S.’s First Amendment rights, stating “we find that the School District’s 
disciplinary action[s] taken against J.S. did not violate his First Amendment 
right to freedom of speech.”477
As the above facts and holdings demonstrate, courts are interpreting and 
applying the Tinker analysis in various ways that do not seem to be consis-
tent.478  Some courts indicate that Tinker applies to both on and off-campus 
student speech while others courts conclude that it applies only to on-campus 
speech.479  Facts that establish a “substantial disruption” vary from district to 
district.480  Sometimes the geographic location of the speech is determinative, 
while at other times courts consider the nexus between the off-campus 
speech and the on-campus impact when deciding if Tinker is applicable.481  If 
the lack of clarity from the cases is not sufficient, the article will next con-
sider the impact of the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ 
laws and interpretations regarding harassment as well as state legislation that 
 473. Id. at 864. 
 474. Id. at 865.
 475. Id. at 868–69. 
 476. Id. at 869. 
 477. J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 478. See, e.g., Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012); J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 479. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865. 
 480. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 869. 
 481. Compare Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 574, with J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 865.  The K–
12 student speech and school discipline cases continue to arise and head into court.  See, e.g.,
Kowalski I, 652 F.3d at 567.  Three appellate briefs involving schools and student speech cited 
to Tinker.  Brief of Appellees at 13–22, C.H. ex rel. Hardwick v. Heyward, No. 12–1445 (4th 
Cir. Aug. 17, 2012); Brief of Appellants at 21, Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., No. 12–
60264 (5th Cir. June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants, Bell]; Brief of Appellees at 21–
33, Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 11–17127 (9th Cir. May 7, 2012) [hereinafter 
Brief of Appellees, Wynar].  Another case involving school discipline and student speech was 
decided on September 6, 2012.  R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 
12–588, 2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012). 
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mandates school boards provide “safe” schools.482  Both the Department of 
Education and several state legislatures not only ask, but require, public 
schools to enact and enforce certain policies that involve schools with off-
campus student cyberspeech.483  Are these regulations and legislation, at both 
the state and federal levels, constitutional, given the various interpretations 
of the Supreme Court decisions about off-campus student cyberspeech? 
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS
If interpreting and applying the legal analysis required by the Morse
quartet is confusing,484 add more confusion to the analysis when the anti-
harassment provisions, monitored by the Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights, are thrown into the mixture.485  In 2010, the Department of 
Education drafted a DCL486 that lauded efforts by school boards to deal with 
the harmful effects of bullying.487  However, the letter warned schools not to 
forget that some behaviors, labeled as bullying, actually constituted peer 
harassment on the basis of “race, color, national origin, sex, and disabil-
ity.”488  Understanding the distinction between what constitutes bullying and 
what constitutes harassment is crucial because the Department of Educa-
tion’s Office for Civil Rights concerns itself with the imposition of liability 
for peer harassment that is “based on race, color, national origin, sex or dis-
ability.”489  The Department of Education reminded schools of their legal 
obligations regarding the enforcement of civil rights statutes by the Depart-
 482. See discussion infra Part III.  The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
enforces civil rights laws for programs that receive federal funding from the Department of 
Education.  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3; see also 20 U.S.C. § 3413(a) (2006).  
Because of this, the Department of Education interacts with school administrators for elemen-
tary and secondary schools, vocational schools, colleges and universities, proprietary schools, 
state education agencies, libraries, and museums.  OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3.  
The Office for Civil Rights enforces the statutes “prohibit[ing] discrimination on the basis of 
race, color [or] national origin, sex, [and] disability.”  Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 12131(2). 
 483. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2012); OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3. 
 484. See Dickler, supra note 92, at 380–81. 
 485. OCR:  Know Your Rights, supra note 3. 
 486. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1.  This letter is occasionally referred to as 
the DCL in other texts.  Letter from Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sch. Bds. 
Ass’n, to Charlie Rose, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 1 (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Ne-
grón Letter], available at http://www.nsba.org/schoollaw/issues/nsba-letter-to-ed-12-07-
10.pdf. 
 487. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1. 
 488. Id. at 1–2. 
 489. Id.
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ment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.490  Failure to meet these obliga-
tions could result in the imposition of liability.491  Schools, coping with stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights and state legislatures’ anti-bullying statutes, 
must also deal with the Department of Education’s peer harassment require-
ments.492  What happens when there is a conflict?  This section will explore 
those topics. 
By 2010, the topic of school bullying had become so widespread and 
public493 that the Assistant Secretary for the Department of Education’s Of-
fice for Civil Rights, Russlynn Ali, spoke to the subject with a DCL on Oc-
tober 26, 2010.494  Directed to “state departments of education and local 
school districts,” the letter applauded the anti-bullying efforts made by these 
organizations, noting:  “Bullying fosters a climate of fear and disrespect that 
can seriously impair the physical and psychological health of its victims and 
create conditions that negatively affect learning, thereby undermining the 
ability of students to achieve their full potential.”495  The letter indicated that 
some behavior that would fall under a school’s anti-bullying policy might 
also “trigger responsibilit[y] under one or more of the federal antidiscrimina-
tion laws enforced by the Department[] [of Education].”496  The Department 
of Education then warned schools to not only address student conduct that 
fell under its bullying policies, but also to consider whether such conduct 
resulted in discriminatory harassment.497
According to the letter, labels used by schools to pigeon-hole behavior 
were not determinative as to how a school was expected to respond to an 
incident.498  The letter advised schools to impartially investigate incidents 
from a perspective of ascertaining whether the conduct involved harassment 
that was based on “race, color, national origin, sex, [or] disability.”499  To 
further explain, the Department of Education indicated that “[h]arassing con-
duct [could] take many forms.”500  It suggested the following examples: 
• “verbal acts and name-calling;” 
 490. Id. at 1–3. 
 491. See id.
 492. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 11–13. 
 493. See Bullying Statistics 2010, supra note 350. 
 494. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1, 10. 
 495. Id. at 1. 
 496. Id.
 497. Id.
 498. Id. at 3. 
 499. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2–3. 
 500. Id. at 2. 
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• “graphic and written statements, which may include the use of cell 
phones or the [i]nternet;” 
• “or other conduct that may be physically threatening, harmful, or hu-
miliating.”501
The letter stated that “[h]arassment does not have to include intent to harm, 
be directed at a specific target, or involve repeated incidents.”502  Instead, 
“[h]arassment creates a hostile environment when the conduct is sufficiently 
severe, pervasive, or persistent so as to interfere with or limit a student’s 
ability to participate in or benefit from the services, activities, or opportuni-
ties offered by a school.”503  The letter then explained that “[w]hen such har-
assment is based on race, color, national origin, sex, or disability, it violates 
the civil rights laws that [the Office for Civil Rights] enforces.”504
After defining harassment, the letter told schools that “[a] school is re-
sponsible for addressing harassment incidents about which it knows or rea-
sonably should have known. . . . When responding to harassment, a school 
must take immediate and appropriate action to investigate or otherwise de-
termine what occurred.”505  If the school determined there had been discrimi-
natory harassment, it was advised to “take prompt and effective steps . . . to 
end the harassment.”506  Punishment of the student offender would not neces-
sarily suffice.507  Instead, the school has a responsibility to discover and erad-
icate the problem, handle the transgressors, provide training, and put a pro-
gram in place to see that the harassment did not reoccur.508
Concerned about the implications of the above letter, Francisco M. Ne-
grón, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, re-
sponded on December 7, 2010, writing to Charlie Rose, the Department of 
Education’s General Counsel.509  The letter began by stating the Board’s fear 
“that absent clarification, the [Department of Education’s] expansive reading 
of the law as stated in the DCL will invite misguided litigation.”510  Referring 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educa-
 501. Id.
 502. Id.
 503. Id.
 504. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2. 
 505. Id.
 506. Id.
 507. See id. at 3. 
 508. Id.
 509. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 1, 11. 
 510. Id. at 1. 
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tion,511 the letter noted that Davis imposed liability only upon the demonstra-
tion that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, while the Octo-
ber 10th Department of Education letter provided for the imposition of liabil-
ity for harassment about which the school knows or reasonably should have 
known.512  Besides the distinction between actual knowledge and the standard 
of should have known, the letter further noted that: 
Davis holds that only “harassment that is so severe, pervasive, 
and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access 
to an educational opportunity or benefit” may result in [the imposi-
tion of] liability for the school district.  The DCL, in contrast, 
states the following:  “Harassment creates a hostile environment 
when the conduct is sufficiently severe, pervasive, or persistent so 
as to interfere with or limit a student’s ability to participate in or 
benefit from the services, activities, or opportunities offered by 
the school.”513
On page six, Negrón’s letter noted that the Department of Education’s Octo-
ber 26th letter only minimally acknowledged the limitations of schools to 
discipline students regarding harassment when students’ First Amendment 
free speech rights were involved.514  Negrón wrote: 
[S]chool districts may discipline students within the limitations of 
First Amendment for on-campus, non-school sponsored speech in 
the following instances only:  if the speech is likely to cause a 
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school ac-
tivities” or the speech collides with “the rights of other students to 
be secure and . . . let alone;” if the speech is “sexually explicit, in-
decent or lewd;” or if it “can reasonably be regarded as encourag-
ing illegal drug use.”515
Because of the Morse quartet, Negrón argued that many state legislatures, 
when enacting cyberbullying or bullying legislation, attempted to define bul-
lying, cyberbullying, and harassment in such a way that the terms did not run 
afoul of the meaning and application of students’ First Amendment rights as 
delineated by the Morse quartet.516  However, Negrón argued that the De-
 511. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 512. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2; see also Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 
2.
 513. Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 2–3. 
 514. Id. at 1, 6. 
 515. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
 516. See id.; see also Dickler, supra note 92, at 361–62. 
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partment of Education’s interpretation, enforcement, and imposition of liabil-
ity upon schools for violating the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws showed no 
such understanding.517  How could a school deal with Snyder’s hate speech 
without running afoul of the Department’s Civil Rights’ laws?518  It was in-
deed a dilemma. 
IV. STATE ANTI-BULLYING LAWS
Between 1995 and April 2011, forty-six states enacted legislation to 
deal with bullying.519  A quick look at the state legislation indicates that state 
legislatures have frequently used “harassment” and “bullying” interchangea-
bly.520  Given the specific legal definition of “harassment” as enforced by the 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights,521 more confusion en-
sues.522  Some states apply the legislation to off-campus speech while others 
do not.523  Some address cyberspeech while others ignore it.524
In December of 2011, the Department of Education released a report, 
Analysis of State Bullying Laws and Policies.525 The study states that be-
tween 1999 and 2010, there were over one hundred and twenty bills intro-
duced or amended by state legislatures to either require schools or the juve-
nile justice system to deal with bullying.526  While some of these laws require 
discipline by schools when bullying occurs, other laws require the interven-
tion of the juvenile justice system.527  Some legislatures included model bul-
lying policies that schools could adopt in order to show compliance.528
 517. See Negrón Letter, supra note 486, at 6–7. 
 518. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011); Dear Colleague Letter, supra 
note 80, at 1–3. 
 519. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 15, 17. 
 520. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. States whose legislation uses the words “bul-
lying,” “cyber-bullying,” or “harassment” include, but are not limited to the following states:  
Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, 
Washington, and West Virginia.  Id.
 521. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 2. 
 522. See STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 17–18. 
 523. NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N, supra note 77. 
 524. Id.
 525. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at i–ii. 
 526. See id. at 16. 
 527. Id. at 16, 19–20.
 528. Id. at 19. 
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According to the report’s executive summary, forty-six states have en-
acted bullying laws.529  Forty-three of these states direct schools to create 
anti-bullying policies; yet three of these states fail to define the behavior that 
constitutes bullying.530  Thirty-six states prohibit bullying via electronic me-
dia while thirteen of the forty-six states give schools the authority to disci-
pline off-campus behavior if the behavior creates a hostile school environ-
ment.531
As state legislatures and school agencies as well as local school boards 
grapple with cyberbullying, the First Amendment, and the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights definition of “harassment,” there are 
many publications offering model legislation that will allegedly satisfy eve-
ryone and every requirement.532  According to Stuart-Cassel and Dayton, 
state legislatures should ensure that school bullying legislation incorporates 
the following components: 
• a statement of purpose that explains the reason for the legisla-
tion;533
• a statement of scope that defines the extent or reach of the leg-
islation, i.e. to what behaviors is it applicable and to what behav-
iors is it not applicable;534
• definitions and examples of behaviors that constitute bullying, 
cyberbullying, and harassment; these definitions should protect 
students from the day to day realities of bullying yet not be so 
overbroad that free speech rights are intruded upon;535
 529. Id. at x.  Hawaii, Montana, Michigan, and South Dakota were the only states that did 
not have some form of bullying legislation in effect as of April 2011.  STUART-CASSEL ET AL., 
supra note 52, at 17. 
 530. Id. at 25.  Arizona, Minnesota and Wisconsin enacted anti-bullying legislation but did 
not define the behavior that constitutes bullying.  Id. 
 531. Id. at 15. 
 532. See Dayton et al., Model Anti-Bullying Legislation:  Promoting Student Safety, Civil-
ity, and Achievement Through Law and Policy Reform, 272 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 24–32 (2011); 
see also STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 89–94.  John Dayton, Anne Proffitt Dupre, 
and Ann Elizabeth Blankenship discussed the creation of a model anti-bully statute that would 
protect students and promote civility and safety in a recent article.  See Dayton et al., supra 
note 532, at 25–32. 
 533. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 22; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 
25.
 534. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 23; see also Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 
26.
 535. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 24–25; see also Dayton et al., supra note 
532, at 24, 26–27. 
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• the development and creation of state wide school policies 
that protect children’s rights to be free from bullying and to exer-
cise their First Amendment rights; such policies can be shared by 
school districts throughout the state;536
• a requirement that school personnel model appropriate behav-
ior and enforce anti-bullying policies;537
• a requirement that schools publicize and communicate the ex-
istence of school anti-bullying policies;538
• a requirement that training be provided for school personnel to 
model appropriate behavior and counsel students whose behavior 
violates school policies;539
• a mandatory reporting requirement, requiring schools to report 
violations of school policies;540
• a requirement that criminal acts be treated as criminal acts and 
not as bullying;541 and 
• a requirement that appropriate counseling and disciplinary 
provisions be provided for students whose conduct violates school 
bullying policies.542
While the above suggestions for model legislation and model school 
policies regarding bullying are useful, they are still not sufficiently detailed 
to answer the questions that courts and school districts continue to ask:  Can 
off-campus student cyberspeech be punished by schools?543  If so, under 
what circumstances can off-campus speech be punished?544  Answering these 
 536. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 18–19, 22, 24–25, 28. 
 537. Id. at 33; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 27–28. 
 538. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 32. 
 539. Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30. 
 540. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 36–37; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 28. 
 541. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 20; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30–31. 
 542. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 52, at 69–70; Dayton et al., supra note 532, at 30. 
 543. See, e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 798 (N.D. Ohio 
2002) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. 
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 544. Presently, there are two student speech cases being appealed from federal district 
courts to federal circuit courts that involved the discipline of off-campus student cyberspeech.  
Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 7 (appealing to the United States Court of Ap-
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questions addresses the intersection of students’ First Amendment rights, the 
Department of Education’s enforcement of civil rights laws, and state anti-
bullying legislation.545
V. ANALYSIS
As Snyder so clearly stated:  Speech, even painful and hurtful speech, is 
revered and protected in America.546  Why?  It is believed that self-
government, to a great degree, is determined by the free exchange of ideas 
even if it does lead to an “uninhibited [and] robust” discussion.547  “‘[T]he 
essence of self-government’” is believed to be the ability to speak out on 
matters of public importance and to discuss unpopular viewpoints.548  The 
suppression of speech counteracts this belief.549  So deeply ingrained in the 
American psyche is the principle of free speech that America, as a society, 
was willing to tolerate the free speech rights of Nazis to march through a 
peals for the Fifth Circuit); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 7 (being appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).  In Bell v. Itawamba County School 
Board, Taylor Bell wrote and published, via Facebook and YouTube, a rap song that was 
critical of his coaches.  859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012).  Taylor was suspended 
for a week and then moved to an alternative school for the remainder of the semester because 
his rap song was deemed by the school board to constitute both harassment of school employ-
ees and threats.  Id.; Brief of Appellants, Bell, supra note 481, at 16.  In Wynar v. Douglas 
County School District, Wynar instant messaged a classmate, saying that he wanted to “shoot” 
named classmates.  No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRH-VPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 
2011); Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 12.  These instant messages were for-
warded to school administration.  Wynar, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wy-
nar, supra note 481, at 14–15.  The school then suspended Wynar for ninety days.  Wynar,
2011 WL 3512534, at *1; Brief of Appellees, Wynar, supra note 481, at 18.  Also, there is a 
pending case in the District Court of Minnesota that involves off-campus discipline of a stu-
dent for cyberspeech.  R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 
2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012).  In that case, R.S. complained about a hall 
monitor and communicated about sex with a classmate via Facebook.  Id. at *1–2.  The class-
mate’s guardian complained to the school principal.  Id. at *2.  To determine the accuracy of 
these statements, R.S. was detained and her Facebook account was searched by school offi-
cials.  Id.
 545. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273; Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. at 681–83; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 546. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
 547. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)). 
 548. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 
(1964)). 
 549. See id. at 1219 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 
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village of Holocaust Jewish survivors in Skokie, Illinois.550  Given the prior-
ity that is placed on speech in American life, do K–12 students and their 
teachers have free speech rights in school where they are learning to partici-
pate in the “‘marketplace of ideas?’”551
In 1969, the Supreme Court made it plain in Tinker that students and 
teachers did not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate.”552  After Tinker, some would argue that 
later Supreme Court decisions on the topic made it less clear to what extent 
student speech rights existed and when schools could suppress or punish 
student speech.  Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse all indicated that while pro-
tection of student speech rights was important, it was not absolute.553  In Fra-
ser, Justice Burger wrote that “simply because the use of an offensive form 
of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker con-
siders a political point, [does not mean that] the same latitude must be per-
mitted to children in a public school.”554  It became obvious between 1986 
when Fraser was decided, and later in 2007 when Chief Justice Roberts au-
thored the majority opinion in Morse, that confusion within the courts as to 
the correct analysis regarding student speech still existed.555  Justice Roberts 
sought to clarify by writing: 
[I]t is enough to distill from Fraser two basic principles.  First, 
Fraser’s holding demonstrates that “the constitutional rights of 
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with 
the rights of adults in other settings.”  Had Fraser delivered the 
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would 
have been protected.  In school, however, Fraser’s First Amend-
 550. See Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of Expres-
sion:  A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 
185, 203 (2003).  The article indicates that the ACLU’s defense of the Nazis to march through 
Skokie, Illinois, a town then heavily populated with Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, re-
flected the fact that while many theoretically agreed with free speech, the ACLU still lost 15% 
of its membership for defending the free speech rights of Nazis in Skokie in 1978.  Id. at 203 
& n.79.  According to the article, Strossen concluded that while the principle of free speech 
was firmly entrenched within the United States legal system, it was also poorly understood.  
Id. at 203. 
 551. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (quoting 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 552. Id. at 503, 506. 
 553. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97, 410 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 273, 276 (1988) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 509, 512–13); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 554. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677, 682. 
 555. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 409–10; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 264–66, 276; Fraser,
478 U.S. at 679–80, 685–86. 
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ment rights were circumscribed “in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment.”  Second, Fraser established that 
the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.  Whatever 
approach Fraser employed, it certainly did not conduct the “sub-
stantial disruption” analysis prescribed by Tinker.556
With four Supreme Court opinions on K–12 student speech from 1969 
through 2007, it would seem that the issue was settled.557  The analysis 
should have been clear for lower courts to apply to the facts of cases before 
them.  However, the lower courts have applied the Tinker analysis to cases 
that involved similar facts; yet these courts have reached dissimilar conclu-
sions.558
In Doninger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reiterated the problems facing lower courts.559  In addition to the confu-
sion surrounding the application of the Morse quartet analysis to student 
speech cases, courts and schools are now grappling with the implications of 
off-campus cyberspeech that ends up on-campus and is often described by 
schools as “cyberbullying.”560 Doninger II eloquently captured the dilemma 
of lower courts, saying “[t]he law governing restrictions on student speech 
can be difficult and confusing, even for lawyers, law professors, and judges.  
The relevant Supreme Court cases can be hard to reconcile, and courts often 
struggle to determine which standard applies in any particular case.”561
Judges are not alone in their confusion.562  As Naomi Harlin Goodno states in 
an article that she authored:  “There is no Supreme Court case squarely on 
point.  The split in the lower courts’ decisions shows that the law is ambigu-
ous.”563
What is a principal to do?  He or she is “damned if they do and damned 
if they don’t” act when confronted with off-campus cyberspeech that makes 
 556. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396, 404–05 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 557. See id. at 410; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273, 276; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686–87; Tinker,
393 U.S. at 514. 
 558. Compare Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783–84, 790 
(E.D. Mich. 2002), with J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 
2002). 
 559. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d 334, 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 560. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 850–52; see also Evans v. Bayer, 604 F. Supp. 
2d 1365, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 561. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 353 (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 430). 
 562. E.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyber-
bullying:  A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and 
Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 657 (2011). 
 563. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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its way on-campus and involves either bullying or harassment.  Principals, 
school boards, and school districts face numerous questions, including: 
• Whether schools can regulate off-campus student speech that is 
online, i.e., cyberspeech, if it is directed at either school personnel or stu-
dents, and then arrives on-campus?564  If so, under what circumstances can 
this speech be regulated?565
• Whether geography, i.e., on-campus or off-campus, can be the litmus 
test for regulation of this speech?566
• Whether a substantial disruption is established by the arrival, in any 
form, of off-campus speech on the school’s campus?567  If not, is chaos re-
quired to meet the substantial disruption test?  What constitutes a substantial 
disruption? 
• Whether the individual student’s free speech right that collides with 
another student’s right to be let alone will prevail?  What about a student’s 
right to be free from bullying and harassment?568
Unfortunately, there appear to be more questions than answers, which is why 
many are urging the Supreme Court of the United States to grant certiorari 
and resolve the issue.569
The issues facing the courts, the schools, the state legislatures, the stu-
dents, and the Department of Education can be summarized as:  Can a school 
regulate student speech or expression that occurs outside of school and is not 
connected to a school sponsored event, yet subsequently makes its way on-
campus by either the speaker or others?  If so, under what circumstances can 
the speech be regulated?  If such speech is beyond the school’s ability to 
regulate, can schools escape the imposition of liability by the Department of 
Education and state laws for failure to respond to harassment or bullying?570
 564. See Thomas Wheeler, Facebook Fatalities:  Students, Social Networking, and the 
First Amendment, 31 PACE L. REV. 182, 214 (2011). 
 565. See id. at 199–200. 
 566. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Wheeler, supra note 564, at 214–15. 
 567. See Wheeler, supra note 564, at 199–200. 
 568. See id. at 217. 
 569. See id. at 185. 
 570. See id. at 183–85. 
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If it is possible to evade liability, how do schools, parents, and society want 
to handle the bullying that sometimes leads to suicide?571
A thorough review of Tinker reveals that the Court began its discussion 
by acknowledging that earlier court decisions affirmed “the comprehensive 
authority of the [s]tates and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school[].  
Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.”572  The language 
of Tinker indicates that the Court considered student speech to have First 
Amendment protection regardless of whether it took place inside or outside 
of the classroom.573  The Court said: 
A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on 
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if 
he does so without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.  But con-
duct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially 
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of 
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of speech.574
The Court cites to the earlier decisions of Burnside v. Byars575 and Blackwell 
v. Issaquena County Board of Education,576 to support the above conclu-
sion.577
A literal reading of Tinker reflects that schools can regulate or disci-
pline student speech that occurs off-campus if it has an on-campus impact 
that either causes a substantial disruption with the school’s work, is reasona-
bly foreseeable that it will cause a substantial disruption with the school’s 
 571. See, e.g., id. at 183–84, 227; see also BULLY, http://www.thebullyproject. 
com/movement/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (providing information about the film, Bully,
produced by The Bully Project). 
 572. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (citations 
omitted). 
 573. Id. at 512–13. 
 574. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 575. 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 576. 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 577. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
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work, or it collides with the rights of others.578  While some lower courts 
have debated whether a school’s authority even extends to off-campus stu-
dent speech in any format, Tinker does not appear to contemplate that.579
From my perspective, Tinker is applicable to off-campus speech, including 
cyberspeech, that arrives on-campus and either creates a substantial disrup-
tion or collides with the rights of others.580  Given the technological advances 
of the last twenty years, a geographical litmus test as to when student speech 
can be disciplined by schools is too limited.581
While courts have discussed and analyzed both the “substantial disrup-
tion” and the “reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption” Tinker tests, 
courts have paid little attention to Tinker’s third prong, the “collides with the 
rights of others” test.582  Perhaps this third prong, in conjunction with the 
“substantial disruption” test could be developed and used to analyze student 
speech cases that do not fit the parameters of Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.583  Utilization of the “collides with the rights of others” test might 
resolve some of the behaviors that so bedevil and trouble school administra-
tors.584  How?  This prong could be used to discipline student speech that 
does not substantially disrupt the school’s work but that can be described as 
bullying, harassing, libelous, or threatening.  Speech described as bullying, 
harassing, libelous, or threatening, if it is directed at other students or school 
personnel, is not protected speech and can be disciplined even if it does not 
create a “substantial disruption.”585  Why should this approach be allowed?  
The school’s goal is to teach students civil discourse and debate while pro-
 578. See id. at 514. 
 579. See id. at 507–08; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007).  The Court 
in Morse explained that “[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the 
school context, it would have been protected.”  Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.  This statement adds 
further confusion to the analysis, as some lower courts have concluded that Fraser meant lewd 
speech, if off-campus, could not be regulated under any circumstances.  See Layshock III, 650 
F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. 
ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 580. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 581. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder I, No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, at *9 n.5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 
11, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 582. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th 
Cir. 1966). 
 583. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14; see also Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–73 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 677–80 (1986). 
 584. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513–14. 
 585. See id.
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tecting their rights to debate contentious issues.586  Yet the schools must also 
provide a safe environment in which students can thrive and learn without 
being subjected to harassment, bullying, libel, or threats.  Schools want to 
protect student political speech rights yet also allow schools the flexibility to 
cope with the cruelty, racism, sexism, libel, or threats that other types of stu-
dent speech create.587
With the above approach, the analysis of student school speech, whether 
on or off-campus, then becomes the following: 
• Is the speech lewd, involving a captive audience, and used on cam-
pus?588  If so, apply Fraser.
• If not, is it speech that carries the imprimatur of the school and in-
volves pedagogy?589  If so, apply Kuhlmeier.
• If not, is the speech off-campus speech at a school sponsored event 
that appears to promote illegal drug use?590  If so, apply Morse.
• If neither Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse is applicable, apply Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” test.  Did the speech arrive on-campus and disrupt 
school classes or administration?591  If so, the speech can be disciplined.592
An exception to the “substantial disruption” test might mean that pure politi-
cal speech can be protected even if it does cause a “substantial disruption.”  
What is a substantial disruption?  Courts are still debating this.593  In Don-
inger II, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a 
“substantial disruption” occurred when the school administration was forced 
to have numerous meetings and handle many irate parental emails and phone 
calls because of Avery Donginer’s blog post.594  Yet the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Layshock III, held that the student discus-
sion and administrative uproar caused by Jason Layshock’s parody posting 
 586. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 80, at 1–2. 
 587. See id. at 2. 
 588. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico ex rel. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
859 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). 
 589. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 590. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 591. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 592. Id. at 513. 
 593. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub 
nom. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Doninger II, 642 
F.3d 334, 347 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 594. See Doninger II, 642 F.3d at 341, 351. 
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about the school’s principal did not constitute a substantial and material dis-
ruption.595  If the Supreme Court would define substantial disruption, it 
would greatly assist the analysis of student speech cases.  The definition 
should not be too restrictive, i.e. one person’s bad day should not constitute a 
substantial disruption, yet neither chaos nor turmoil should be required to 
establish substantial disruption.  A description or list of behaviors that dem-
onstrate substantial disruption would help resolve the issue.  From my per-
spective, student speech that requires school personnel to spend 75% of their 
week dealing with the problems generated by the speech could be considered 
a substantial disruption.  School personnel responding to telephone calls, 
emails, student and parent visits, counseling sessions, disciplinary sessions, 
hearings, and classroom time are examples of substantial disruption. 
• If the speech does not cause a substantial disruption, it could be regu-
lated under Tinker’s third prong—the “collides with the rights of others” 
test—if the speech is directed at other students or school personnel and can 
be described as speech that is bullying, harassing, libelous or threatening.596
The above analysis would balance competing rights, allowing schools to 
operate without chaos and disruption while preserving the political speech of 
students and providing a safe school environment that neither permits, con-
dones, or ignores student bullying or harassment. 
How should courts then handle Tinker’s “reasonably foreseeable disrup-
tion” test?  While the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent instant message icon in 
Wisniewski would cause a substantial disruption,597 district courts in Indiana 
and California concluded that raunchy student photos and bullying YouTube 
videos did not substantially disrupt nor was it foreseeable that the student 
behavior involved would disrupt school operations.598  Perhaps the “reasona-
bly foreseeable” test could be retired.  If the “substantial disruption” and 
“collides with the rights of others” tests are used, the “reasonably foresee-
able” test becomes irrelevant.599  Avery Doninger’s blast email and blog cre-
ated a substantial disruption, because parents and students behaved as she 
 595. See Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 207–09, 219. 
 596. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09, 513 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 
(5th Cir. 1966)). 
 597. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 598. T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 (N.D. 
Ind. 2011); J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107–
08, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 599. J.C. ex rel R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1122. 
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requested, contacting the school and bombarding the school with messages 
on the topic of Jamfest.600  School personnel spent days dealing with phone 
calls, emails, and parental concerns that resulted from the Jamfest post.601
Too much staff time was wasted on an issue that can be judged to be rela-
tively unimportant.602  The “substantial disruption” test is necessary because 
Doninger’s speech did not fit in the category of a threat or libel nor did it 
constitute harassment or bullying which would be necessary to apply in a 
“collides with the rights of others” test.603
Using the “collides with the rights of others” test means the court’s 
holding in Wisniewski is correct, as it involved a true threat which would 
permit Wisniewski’s speech to be disciplined.604 T.V.’s holding is also then 
correct under this analysis.605  In T.V. ex rel B.V., the raunchy pictures did not 
involve harassment, bullying, libel, or threats.606  They also did not create a 
substantial disruption at school as only two or three parents complained to 
the school.607  This is not speech with which the school should be involved.608
This speech, while raunchy, should be protected.609  Parents who objected to 
it should interact directly with T.V.’s parents rather than requesting that the 
school act as the intermediary.  In T.V. ex rel B.V., there is not a sufficient 
nexus between the student’s speech, the aggrieved students and parents, and 
the school.610  This speech involved off-campus behavior that should have 
been handled by and among parents rather than involving the school.  Thus, 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana reached 
 600. Doninger I, 527 F.3d 41, 44–45, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d 
at 40), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 499 (2011). 
 601. See id. at 44–45. 
 602. See id. at 46. 
 603. See id. at 53; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
513 (1969). 
 604. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d at 37–38 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).  
While some of the courts discussed “real” threats as opposed to “perceived” threats, this dis-
tinction is not helpful.  Given the ability of individuals to heavily arm themselves and then 
massacre those with whom they disagree, it seems unfair to place school administrators in the 
position of trying to sort through what constitutes a real threat as opposed to a joke. 
 605. See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 784 
(N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 606. See id. at 771, 775. 
 607. Id. at 784. 
 608. See id. at 783–84.
 609. Id. at 776. 
 610. T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F. Supp. 2d at 783. 
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the correct decision in T.V. ex rel B.V., as did the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Wisniewski.611
Yet while the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California applied the correct analysis to the facts in J.C. ex rel. R.C., it 
reached the wrong conclusion.612  J.C.’s behavior toward C.C. constituted 
harassment, bullying, and possibly libel.  Had the court used the “collides 
with the rights of others” test rather than the “substantial disruption” test, it 
would have been easy for the school to discipline J.C. without worrying 
about whether J.C.’s behavior resulted in a substantial disruption of work at 
school. 
Using the above analysis, i.e., the student’s speech either creates a sub-
stantial disruption at school or collides with the rights of others, I would ar-
gue that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached 
the correct decision in Kowalski I, using the wrong analysis.  Kara Kowalski 
used the internet to mock, taunt, bully, and harass a fellow classmate, Shay 
N.613  While Kara’s off-campus speech may not have created a substantial 
disruption in terms of additional work created for school administrators, it 
was conduct that could certainly be described as bullying or harassing an-
other classmate.614  Again using the above analysis, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in its en banc opinions in Layshock III615
and Snyder III,616 reached incorrect decisions and used the wrong analysis.  
Since both of those decisions involved off-campus student cyberspeech that 
could be described as libelous or harassing of school personnel, one could 
conclude, using the “collides with the rights of others” test, that Tinker was 
satisfied and that both Layshock and Snyder could be disciplined for their 
speech.617
As Tinker is now being construed, it is difficult for courts to apply the 
appropriate analysis to the particular facts of a case before them.618  Melinda 
 611. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007); T.V. ex rel B.V., 807 F. 
Supp. 2d at 784. 
 612. See J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117–
18, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 613. See Kowalski I, 652 F.3d 565, 567–69 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1095 
(2012). 
 614. See id. at 572. 
 615. Layshock III, 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 616. J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d 915, 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 617. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder III, 650 F.3d at 930; Layshock III, 650 F.3d at 219. 
 618. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
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Cupps Dickler’s excellent article suggests that despite the confusion of the 
student speech cases that the justices agree on the following principles: 
• “[S]tudents retain significant First Amendment protection [while] in 
school;”619
• However, students’ rights are limited and are not as extensive as 
those of adults;620
• “[S]chool officials [are] permitted substantial discretion to maintain 
discipline, even” if that results—not intentionally, but as a consequence—in 
the restriction of speech;621
• “[P]olitical . . . speech is strongly protected . . . from viewpoint dis-
crimination;”622
• “Tinker’s ‘substantial disruption’ test [is still] applicable to any stu-
dent speech that [is] not . . . regulated . . . by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.”623
VI. CONCLUSION
Schools, state legislatures, courts, students, parents, and the Department 
of Education continue to grapple with balancing the speech rights of students 
with the rights of students to be “‘let alone.’”624  Since the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in three cases this past term, it seems clear that they con-
sider the matter settled.625  However, a reading of decisions from the various 
district and circuit courts in the last decade indicates confusion still exists.626
Lower courts are applying, misapplying, or misunderstanding the holdings 
from the Court’s decisions in this area.627  Different results, often with simi-
lar factual situations, continue.628  A citation analysis of Kowalski, indicates 
 619. Dickler, supra note 92, at 380. 
 620. See id. 
 621. Id. 
 622. Id. 
 623. Id.
 624. McCarthy, supra note 45, at 19–20; see also discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
 625. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 626. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
 627. See discussion supra Part V. 
 628. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
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that cases in the secondary student cyberspeech arena continue through the 
court’s pipelines.629  Given the importance of bully prevention, the liability 
issues involved, and the confusion surrounding what is deemed to be the 
appropriate reaction of school officials to off-campus student cyberspeech 
that comes on campus, it would be very helpful if the Court addressed this 
subject and provided a clear analysis soon. 
 629. See, e.g., R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, No. 12-588, 2012 
WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012); Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 
2d 834, 836 (N.D. Miss. 2012); Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:09-cv-0626-LRH-
VPC, 2011 WL 3512534, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 10, 2011). 
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